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ABSTRACT 
 
Death and Doctrine: U.S. Army Officers’ Perceptions of American Casualty Aversion 
1970-1999. (May 2010) 
Daniel Isaac Johnson, B.S., United States Military Academy; M.A., Webster University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Brian McAllister Linn 
 
While academics and commentators have devoted considerable energy to 
analyzing the relationship between United States military casualties and the reaction of 
American public opinion, few have taken notice of the opinions and perceptions of 
military officers.  U.S. Army officers, comprising the bulk of the American military 
leadership, sustained a thorough debate concerning casualties and public opinion 
between 1970 and 1999.  That debate is apparent from a study of articles in the 
military’s professional journals, contributions to scholarly journals, memoirs, and 
monographs emerging from the various service schools. 
Examining the material generated by officers during these decades reveals that 
they perceived a trend - as well as disclosing a trend in their own writing and 
discussions.  Shaken by the experience of the Vietnam War, unsettled by the public’s 
rejection of that war, officers struggled to prepare for future wars.  In the thirty years 
under discussion, U.S. Army officers noticed an emphasis on technology intended to be 
more lethal to the enemy and to provide more protection for the American soldier.  
  
iv 
Officers observed a doctrinal trend beginning with conserving scarce manpower, 
escalating to minimizing casualties, and reaching the establishment of force protection 
as a mission equal to any in a given operation.  American officers perceived that their 
political and military leadership had first grown wary of spending American lives and 
gradually came to view casualties as synonymous with defeat.  Associated with this 
phenomenon, officers noted that in many cases – increasing as this era advanced – 
sustaining casualties below a given threshold marked the operation as a victory.  In 
sum, military officers observed a trend in which America’s civilian and military 
leadership strived to avoid sending men into conflict, attempting to mitigate through 
technology the risk combat posed to soldiers, and reacting to casualties as if they 
signified military defeat.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION: THE ISSUE OF CASUALTIES 
 
In 2001, United States Army Lieutenant Colonel Richard R. Caniglia completed 
an analysis of the American military participation in operations throughout the Balkans.  
Caniglia declared that “[Officers] below the senior military level are convinced that the 
United States is casualty-averse.”1  Relying heavily on anecdotal evidence from the U.S. 
Armed Forces’ involvement in Kosovo in the 1990s, Caniglia argued that casualty 
aversion was a self-fulfilling belief, propagating its own bureaucracy and policies of 
force-protection.  These in turn created a reinforcing cycle, an organizational culture 
that had less and less tolerance for casualties even as it worked to limit them.  One of 
the important aspects of Caniglia’s argument is his emphasis on the officers’ perception 
of American casualty aversion and the effect that perception had upon the policy of 
force protection.  These officers observed a transformation of policy, a development 
that diminished the military’s trust in public support even as it diminished the public’s 
trust in military competency.2
                                                 
 
 
1 Richard R. Caniglia, “U.S. and British Approaches to Force Protection,” Military Review 81 (July-August 
2001): 77. 
2 Ibid., 77-78. 
____________________________ 
This thesis follows the style of Journal of Military History. 
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U.S. Army officers’ observations of American society in the 1970s, 1980s, and 
1990s revolve around certain military operations and the civilian reactions to those 
operations.  Army personnel observed and discussed the operations carried out by the 
other service branches, just as Air Force, Navy, and Marine officers analyzed Army 
operations.  During these decades, the scholarly conversation among sociologists and 
defense analysts also considered these operations and circumstances, and their 
discourse at times informed the professional discussion among officers.  Immediately 
after the Vietnam War, a consensus emerged among defense analysts that the 
American public suffered from a phenomenon variously described as casualty shyness, 
casualty intolerance, casualty dread, or casualty aversion.  To put it more simply, that 
American society appeared unwilling to suffer casualties in military operations.  This 
consensus, dominated by sociologist John Mueller, gained a wide audience and popular 
appeal, both in the United States and abroad.3
                                                 
3 Christopher Gelpi, Peter D. Feaver, and Jason Reifler, Paying the Human Costs of War: American Public 
Opinion and Casualties in Military Conflicts (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009), 1-66; Jason 
Dylan McMahan, “Explaining and Exploiting American Casualty Aversion” (master’s thesis, University of 
Virginia, 2002); K.S. Balshaw, “Spending Treasure Today but Spilling Blood Tomorrow: What are the 
Implications for Britain of America’s Apparent Aversion to Casualties?” Defence Studies 1 (Spring 2001): 
99-120; Jonathon R. Moelter, “Effects of Foreign Perceptions of U.S. Casualty Aversion on U.S. 
International Relations” (master’s thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2002); Sidney 
Verba and Richard A. Brody, “Participation, Policy Preferences, and the War in Vietnam,” Public Opinion 
  Mueller’s theory of a reflexive and 
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inexorable decline of popular support for war based on the number of casualties 
suffered “fixed in the public mind the idea that support for Vietnam buckled as the 
body-bag toll mounted,” permanently linking through his work’s broad appeal declining 
support with mounting casualties.4
A number of scholars challenged Mueller’s thesis, introducing factors that 
increased the complexity of what Mueller had described as a simple relationship 
between casualties and popular support.  After analyzing the response to the 1983 
bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut, Lebanon, RAND researcher Benjamin 
Schwarz persuasively argued that, after the attack, the public increased its support for 
the operation, inclining toward a punitive escalation of military activity rather than 
withdrawal.
   
5
                                                                                                                                                
Quarterly 34 (Autumn 1970): 325-332; Jeffrey S. Milstein, Dynamics of the Vietnam War: A Quantitative 
Analysis and Predictive Computer Simulation (Columbia: Ohio State University Press, 1974). 
  Also referencing the operations in Lebanon, Professor James Burk argued 
that the support for military operations depended upon several factors: a perception of 
4 John Mueller, “Trends in Popular Support for the Wars in Korea and Vietnam,” American Political 
Science Review 65 (June 1971): 364-366; Quote from Gelpi, et al., Paying the Human Costs of War, 9.  The 
political discussions in the 1970s frequently referenced Mueller and his work.  One example: George W. 
Grayson, “The Economy: Will the Upswing Help Ford?” Washington Post, 2 September, 1976, A15. 
5 Benjamin C. Schwarz, Casualties, Public Opinion and U.S. Military Intervention: Implications for U.S. 
Regional Deterrence Strategies (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1994), 25. Schwarz asserts (p.20) that casualty 
totals from Korea and Vietnam founded preliminary societal fears.  For an earlier analysis of the Beirut 
attack, see Brian Jenkins, “Defense Against Terrorism,” Political Science Quarterly 101 (1986): 773-774. 
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clear national interest, a degree of consensus among American elites, and a perception 
of success.  Burk demonstrated through an analysis of polling data that the public 
support for the intervention in Lebanon had in fact declined before suffering the 
bombing casualties, reflecting the discord among the political and military elite.  Burk 
argued that public support increased after the casualties, counter to the dictates of 
casualty aversion theory.6
Further complicating Mueller’s thesis, Eric Larson suggested, after an analysis of 
the public reaction to military operations through the 1993 intervention in Somalia, 
that much of the populace of the United States appeared capable of complex cost-
benefit analysis when presented with a proposed military action.  The American people 
showed a willingness to suffer casualties for meaningful objectives and did not demand 
a zero-casualty prediction so long as the objective reflected a “moral force or . . . 
recognized national interests.” Larson argued as well that this relationship depended 
much upon the quality of leadership demonstrated by the political elites.  Similarly, 
suffering casualties did not always spur the public to demand “escalation to victory.”
 
7
Larson had the benefit of observing both Operation Desert Storm in the Persian 
Gulf and the American intervention in Somalia – particularly the subsequent 
   
                                                 
6 James Burk, “Public Support for Peacekeeping in Lebanon and Somalia: Assessing the Casualties 
Hypothesis,” Political Science Quarterly 114 (Spring 1999): 53-78. 
7 Eric V. Larson, Casualties and Consensus: The Historical Role of Casualties in Domestic Support for U.S. 
Military Operations (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1996), 100. 
 5 
withdrawal from Somalia provoked by the battle in Mogadishu.  Several scholars 
suggested over the course of the decade that the outcome of the Somali intervention 
reinforced the idea that the American populace reflexively opposed taking casualties.8  
The military experiences in Haiti, particularly that of the USS Harlan County, and in the 
Balkans reinforced such perceptions.  Scholars such as Burk opposed this argument, 
however, demonstrating that support for the operation in Somalia had declined 
significantly before Mogadishu and that the inflicted casualties shattered the consensus 
of elite political support, not popular support.9  Christopher Gelpi and Peter Feaver 
argued that the American public ceased supporting the mission because of the shift 
away from the humanitarian Operation Restore Hope to the peace-enforcement of 
UNOSOM II, particularly as the public perceived the peace-enforcement mission as 
failing. 10  Gelpi and Feaver pointed to the “rally-round-the-flag” effect, elite consensus, 
and cost-benefit analysis and asserted that the “U.S. public is not casualty phobic . . . 
[but] can be thought of as ‘defeat phobic’.”11
                                                 
8 Steven Kull and I.M. Destler, Misreading the Public: The Myth of a New Isolationism (Washington, D.C.: 
Brookings, 1999), 91; Louis Klarevas, “Trends: The United States Peace Operation in Somalia,” Public 
Opinion Quarterly 64 (Winter 2000): 528. 
  Gelpi and Feaver convincingly argued 
that in the public perception the results of military action mattered most, and a lack of 
9 Burk, “Support for Peacekeeping in Lebanon and Somalia,” 76. 
10 Gelpi, et al., Paying the Human Costs of War, 45. 
11 Ibid., 260; Peter D. Feaver and Christopher Gelpi, “A Look At . . . Casualty Aversion: How Many Deaths 
are Acceptable? A Surprising Answer,” Washington Post, November 7, 1999, B03. 
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progress sapped support more quickly than bloodshed.  This scholarly debate, even as 
it informed some, failed to gain significant ground against the popular belief in casualty 
aversion.12
More likely than most academics to provide the casualties under discussion, 
military officers remained generally absent from the wider scholarly debate.  This thesis 
will demonstrate, however, that this was not because officers ignored the topic.  Army 
officers, representing the majority of the commissioned leaders of the American armed 
forces, produced the bulk of the material discussed in this thesis.  Their representation 
and perceptions direct this argument; for simplicity’s sake, the use of the term “military 
officer” in this thesis will indicate, unless otherwise specified, an officer in the U.S. 
Army.  A study of the essays emerging in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s from the Army 
War College, the Naval War College, the Air University, the Army Command and 
General Staff College, the Marine Command and Staff College, the professional 
publications Parameters, Military Review and the other service magazines revealed 
considerable and developing debate over casualty aversion.  The student papers 
emerging from the military’s institutes of higher education proved particularly useful in 
this respect; they presented a chance to observe the thoughts and perspectives of 
   
                                                 
12 Gelpi, et al., Paying the Human Costs of War, 1, 4; Max Boot, “Envisioning a Future of Casualty-Free 
Pushbutton Wars? Get Over It,” American Enterprise 12 (October-November 2001): 31; Paul Cornish, 
“Myth and Reality: U.S. and UK Approaches to Casualty Aversion and Force Protection,” Defence Studies 
3 (Summer 2003): 121. 
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experienced officers after both introspection and research.  In addition, academic 
publications, notably the Journal of Conflict Resolution and Armed Forces & Society 
address the topic of American casualty aversion and its impact on the U.S. Armed 
Forces.  Finally, the manuals and doctrine produced and published during these 
decades demonstrate the fulfillment of the intellectual process. 
The structure of this work echoes the natural division of the decades.  The first 
chapter will address the 1970s.  During that decade, the United States Army recovered 
after its withdrawal from Vietnam.  Vietnam occupied much of the intellectual 
attention and subsequently the material produced by officers who, throughout the 
decade, fought the war over and over again in their minds. Bearing that in mind, the 
chapter will address three points: U.S. Army officers’ perceptions of societal pressure to 
limit casualties, the reflection of that pressure in the military culture of the 1970s – 
particularly the development of the All-Volunteer Force, and the attendant appearance 
of a concern for casualty minimization in doctrine.   
The second chapter will examine the 1980s.  Despite lacking a great war during 
the decade, service members deployed around the globe throughout the decade.  This 
service was not bloodless.  Perhaps the most critical portion of the decade, in this 
discussion, proved to be the bombing of the U.S. Marines’ barracks in Beirut in 1983, 
coupled with the intervention in Grenada during the same year.  This chapter will 
revolve around a discussion of doctrine and military culture.  Both reflected the 
challenges of dealing not only with the still-unproven volunteer system but also with 
 8 
the American involvement in what officers described as “low intensity conflicts” during 
the Cold War.  Much of the officers’ professional discussion reflected the challenge of 
succeeding in low intensity conflicts without alienating the public and while coping with 
a doctrine and organization predicated upon a major war with the Soviet Union. 
The final chapter will address the contributions of operations in the Persian 
Gulf, Somalia, Haiti, and the Balkans to the debate on casualty aversion.  Following the 
success of the short Desert Storm campaign, some officers claimed that senior military 
leaders appeared more concerned with avoiding the stigma of failure than with 
achieving military victory.  Bound to this argument was the critique of the military’s 
growing “zero-defect” mentality and its fixation on force-protection.13
I intend to demonstrate that, over the three decades under consideration, 
United States military officers developed a perception of the American public as 
casualty averse.  Officers expected rising casualties to diminish public and political 
support for military operations.  Despite a deepening scholarly understanding of the 
publics’ reaction to casualties, a preponderance of the military officer corps expressed 
  The officers’ 
discussion of force-protection, its application, and its doctrine is integral to 
understanding how military officers perceived American casualty aversion in the 
decade.  Each of these factors is connected and apparent in the context of the major 
military actions in the 1990s. 
                                                 
13 Caniglia, “U.S. and British Approaches to Force Protection,” 78; Cornish, “Myth and Reality,” 123-124. 
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a perception of a casualty averse general public whose beliefs these officers observed 
influencing the nation’s political elite.14
The significance of this discussion of perception rests upon the nature of war in 
the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s.  During this period, military officers recognized an 
increased momentum toward American involvement in asymmetric or fourth-
generation warfare, insurgencies, guerrillas and terrorism.
  
15
                                                 
14 Burk, “Support for Peacekeeping in Lebanon and Somalia,” 78.  Here he referenced Donald C.F. Daniel, 
"The United States," in Challenges for the New Peacekeepers, ed. Trevor Findlay (Oxford, England: Oxford 
University Press, 1996), 94-95, who suggested that “members of Congress place more credence in what 
their constituents tell them than what national polls show, and that patterns of constituent contacts 
might actually support something like the casualties hypothesis.” 
  Such conflicts lack clear 
national interests, which military and political leaders noted as a factor influencing 
public support.  Without a clear national motive for such conflicts, the national elite 
struggle to justify American casualties in distant military operations.  Whether 
described as peacekeeping, peace-enforcement, nation building, counter-insurgency 
operations, or any other euphemism, victory in military conflict entails a risk of 
casualties.  The perception, widespread among American military officers, that the 
American public would react negatively to any American casualties attacked the 
needed trust between a society and its military.  At one level, it charged that the 
American society cannot be trusted to soberly invoke military force, and all that it 
15 David Harper, “Targeting the American Will and Other Challenges for 4th Generation Leadership,” 
Military Review 87 (March-April 2007): 95. 
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implies.  At another, it imputed that society could not trust the military to competently 
carry out the missions it was assigned without unnecessary losses.  This frayed trust 
between society and military suggested implications for the willingness of the armed 
forces to take risks and to engage the enemy on behalf of the nation’s government. 
  
 11 
CHAPTER II 
CASUALTY SHOCK: EMERGING FROM VIETNAM IN THE 1970s 
 
Military officers during the 1970s faced the task of rebuilding the United States’ 
armed forces after the Vietnam War.  The U.S. Army had emerged from Vietnam 
grievously damaged if not broken and the other services had suffered, if not to the 
same extent.16
This chapter discusses the ways in which these factors intersected with the 
ongoing conversation among officers concerning the public reaction to casualties.  One 
officer said of that era, “The result of [Vietnam] was a fear, at the highest levels of 
  Senior officers’ distrust for politicians and the media complicated these 
rebuilding efforts.  The end of the draft and the introduction of the All-Volunteer Force 
in 1973 introduced further complexity to the process.  At the same time, it became 
apparent that the military required more than simple repair – the Yom Kippur War 
between Arabs and Israelis in October 1973 shook the American military establishment 
and sent it reaching for a new doctrine.   
                                                 
16 For more on officers’ observations of the state of the military, particularly the U.S. Army, in the wake 
of Vietnam, see Cincinnatus, Self-Destruction: The Disintegration and Decay of the United States Army 
during the Vietnam Era (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1981) 152-158; James Kitfield, Prodigal 
Soldiers: How the Generation of Officers Born of Vietnam Revolutionized the American Style of War (New 
York: Simon & Schuster, 1995); Frederick Kagan, Finding the Target: The Transformation of American 
Military Policy (New York: Encounter Books, 2006), 3-10. 
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command and government, of getting bogged down in a protracted war, [and] suffering 
unacceptably heavy casualties.”17  Many observers pinpointed the Vietnam War as the 
origin of American casualty aversion.  The professional discussion among officers, with 
some exceptions, generally reflects this assumption.  A more complete understanding 
includes earlier American experiences.  George Washington feared colonists lacked the 
resolve to pay the necessary costs for victory during the American Revolution.18  
American leaders who succeeded the general and president later in the 18th century 
considered the costs, both in treasure and in blood, of military action.19  In the 
American Civil War President Abraham Lincoln expressed concern over the political and 
social burden of the mounting tally of casualties.20
As the 19th century ended, signs indicated the increasing lethality of war.  
Antulio Echevarria noted that German, British, American, and French military theorists 
of that era discussed how best to address the larger, more lethal contemporary 
battlefield and accomplish military missions without suffering crippling losses.  The 
introduction of technological developments improved artillery fire and increased the 
efficiency of closer combat through magazine fed-rifles and the machine-gun.  Such 
weapons accompanied a fundamental change in tactics and a greater appreciation for 
   
                                                 
17 Moelter, “Effects of Foreign Perceptions of U.S. Casualty Aversion on U.S. International Relations,” 6. 
18 Gelpi, et al., Paying the Human Costs of War, 3. 
19 Donald B. Vought, “Preparing for the Wrong War?” Military Review 57 (May 1977): 31. 
20 Gelpi, et al, Paying the Human Costs of War, 3. 
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fire superiority.21  One military theorist argued that excessive casualties and 
inconclusive struggle would render future wars incapable of achieving decision.22  At 
much the same time, General Philip Henry Sheridan anticipated that economic and 
political strength would decide future wars as much as military prowess.  Battle would 
become pointless as the costs, both in blood and treasure, became prohibitive.23 Other 
officers maintained, “No victory can be gained without paying for it,” and that “The 
dread of losses is immoral.”24  While that attitude did not prevent leaders such as 
President Woodrow Wilson from fearing “the wastefulness of war,” it dominated the 
American discussion through World War II.25
                                                 
21 Antulio J. Echevarria II, After Clausewitz: German Military Thinkers Before the Great War (Lawrence: 
University Press of Kansas, 2000), 70-73. 
   
22 Ibid., 91.  Echevarria discusses the theorists who oppose Jan Bogomil Bloch in this position as well in 
pages 86-92. 
23 Brian McAllister Linn, The Echo of Battle: The Army’s Way of War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2007), 46-47. 
24 Jette, “The Dread of Incurring Losses on the Battle-field and the Essential Elements of the Offensive,” 
tr. R.H. Wilson, Journal of the Military Service Institution of the United States 51 (November-December 
1912): quotations from 330 and 340. 
25 Gelpi, et al, Paying the Human Costs of War, 3; William O. Odom, After the Trenches: The 
Transformation of U.S. Army Doctrine, 1918-1939 (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1999), 
39.  Odom discussed (p. 43) the Army perception on casualties in the inter-war era. 
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Many officers memorialized the Second World War as the way that America 
should wage war.  Some officers held that, in that conflict, the American military had 
waged a total war and achieved a total victory.  These officers claimed that success 
raised the standard for military achievement to new heights and rationalized the 
concurrent heavy casualty toll.26  Writing in 1962, Lieutenant Commander Robert 
Monroe argued that American armed forces would more likely face limited war in the 
future, rather than total war along the World War II model.  He noted the many 
difficulties, under the American political system, of fighting in this form of conflict.  
Monroe argued these difficulties derived in part from the political opposition, in part 
from American military officers fixated upon total victory, and in part from the effect of 
the daily loss of American lives in such conflict.27
                                                 
26 Carl T. Schmidt, “The Limitation of ‘Total’ War,” Military Review 29 (1949):12-16; Charles A. Lofgren, 
“How New Is Limited War?” Military Review 47 (July 1967):17-19; Frederick S. Rudesheim, “Quick, 
Decisive Victory: Defining Maxim or Illusory Concept Within Army Doctrine?” (student paper, U.S. Army 
School of Advanced Military Studies, 1993), 14, 20, 37; John W. Allen, “The Victory Disease and the U.S. 
Army after the Cold War” (master’s thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1999), 7, 88. 
  The perceived influence of popular 
27 Robert R. Monroe, “Limited War and Political Conflict,” Military Review 42 (October 1962): 3-4.  For 
more on this topic see also, Allen, “Victory Disease,” 88; Jack H. Nunn, “Termination: The Myth of the 
Short, Decisive Nuclear War,” Parameters 10 (December 1980): 37; Charles F. Kriete, “The Moral 
Dimension of Strategy,” Parameters 7 (June 1977):72; Alfred H. Paddock, Jr., “Does the Army have a 
Future? Deterrence and Civil-Military Relations in the Post-Vietnam Era,” Parameters 8 (September 
1978): 51. 
 15 
and political restraints on military policy choices in the years following World War II 
caused many American military officers to believe that the United State’s enemies had 
identified American casualty aversion as a weakness to exploit.  Officers’ noted North 
Vietnamese leader Ho Chi Minh’s strategy of targeting American popular opinion, 
which fed their perception that the forces of communism targeted popular support 
during the Cold War.28  As this idea grew more popular among officers, their fear 
increased that future insurgencies would emerge targeting U.S. political will.29  Colonel 
Robert Gard wrote in 1971 of the difficulty, in such conflicts, of justifying “to American 
society the loss of lives in clear-cut moral terms.”30  Such fears promoted a feeling that 
the American military should avoid direct involvement in insurgencies and small wars; 
yet officers uneasily proposed that avoiding these conflicts could send out “an 
invitation for those who wish us ill to practice those forms” of warfare attacking an 
identified weakness – America’s national will.31
In the post-Vietnam era, three factors combined to influence officers’ 
perception of American tolerance for casualties.  The first was clear – the mass media 
   
                                                 
28 B.A. Clayton, “War Studies,” Military Review 51 (September 1971): 67. 
29 Michael T. Klare, War Without End: American Planning for the Next Vietnams (New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 1972), 61. 
30 Robert G. Gard, Jr., “The Military and American Society,” Foreign Affairs 49 (July 1971): 701. 
31 Vought, “Preparing for the Wrong War?” 33; Richard T. Ackley, “Intervention versus Nonintervention,” 
Military Review 51 (November 1971): 81-82. 
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had made the popular discontent of American society widely apparent, and it plainly 
influenced the political elite.32  The second was the shift from conscription to voluntary 
recruitment.  Recruiting among America’s ‘amilitaristic’ youth forced the services – 
chiefly the army – to change their image.33  “Selling” or advertising itself demanded 
that the traditional values of duty, of fighting and dying for one’s country, fade into the 
background, moving those values down the traditional military hierarchy and elevating 
other values in their place.  Thus, the ‘New Army’ emphasized the message of benefits 
and development and progress. An essential part of the message to recruits became 
the security of service in the armed forces; in fact, recruitment material made little 
mention of combat.34
This positive message ran at odds to the third influence, the evidence of the 
Arab-Israeli War.  That conflict came to a bloody end after intense combat over a brief 
period; eighteen days of combat witnessed over 13,000 soldiers died and nearly 30,000 
   
                                                 
32 Mueller, “Trends in Popular Support for the Wars in Korea and Vietnam,” 366.  For more depth see 
Mueller, War, Presidents and Popular Opinion (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1973). 
33 Richard F. Rosser, “Civil-Military Relations in the 1980s,” Military Review 52 (March 1972): 26; Beth 
Bailey, “The Army in the Marketplace: Recruiting an All-Volunteer Force,” Journal of American History 94 
(June 2007): 50. 
34 Robert K. Griffith, Jr., The U.S. Army’s Transition to the All-Volunteer Force 1968-1974 (Washington, 
D.C.: Center for Military History, 1997), 120-122; Bailey, “The Army in the Marketplace,” 57, 68. 
 17 
wounded.35
Translating their perceptions of American society through these influences 
forced officers to examine the problems within their own organizations.  The American 
military at the beginning of the 1970s needed to deal with rampant drug use, a 
corrupted system of officer promotion, and a populace disaffected by news from 
Vietnam of My Lai, free-fire zones, refugee relocation, body-count emphasis and other 
related subjects.
  Transposing that picture of modern war over the canvas of an American-
Russian clash did not bode well for the recruits glibly promised the benefits of a better 
PX and free space-available travel on military aircraft. 
36  Yet if such stories carried by the press from Vietnam disturbed the 
civilian population, it became an axiom to many officers that the press had a distinct 
anti-military bias.37
                                                 
35 Micheal Clodfelter, Warfare and Armed Conflicts: A Statistical Reference to Casualty and Other Figures, 
1500-2000 (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers, 2002), 646. 
  At its furthest extreme, officers accused the media of exaggerating 
defeats and casualties, turning the American people against the military and the war, 
36 Ronald Spector, “Getting Down to the Nitty-Gritty: Military History, Official History, and the American 
Experience in Vietnam” Military Affairs 38 (February 1974): 12; Rosser, “Civil-Military Relations in the 
1980s,” 24. 
37 John H. Moellering, “The Army Turns Inward?” Military Review 53 (July 1973): 73-74; Gaither C. Bray, 
“The Impact of Mass Media Upon Public Opinion” (student paper, U.S. Army War College, 1973): 22; 
Staudenmaier, “Military Strategy in Transition,” 31. 
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and so stripping both of political support.38
This ‘stab-in-the-back’ ideology affected the relationship between politicians 
and the military as much as the military and the press.
  Some officers found this to be particularly 
galling in light of their perception that the defeat in Vietnam predominately reflected 
the influence of their political overseers.   
39  A 1971 survey of officers at 
the Command and General Staff College revealed that a majority of officers believed 
themselves misunderstood and unappreciated by the public.40  In a 1973 Military 
Review article, Lieutenant Colonel John H. Moellering argued: “We are victimized.  We 
are called upon to take abuse from the press and public for decisions in which we have 
taken no part . . . civilians got the Army improperly involved in the war, [and] then 
made the Army a scapegoat.”41
From a broader perspective, however, officers perceived politicians to be too 
quick to follow the whims of public opinion.  The ensuing distrust for politicians readily 
translated to an increased and worrisome separation of the military from the populace 
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at large, colored in part by disdain.  The notion that the public viewed them so 
negatively fed a trend toward partitioning the armed forces from civilian society, 
turning the U.S. military inward, distrustful of the civilians its leaders blamed for 
abandoning them in Vietnam.  In Moellering’s view, soldiers had “sacrificed the most,” 
and they attributed their failure in Vietnam to their betrayal by politicians and 
journalists.42
Doubtless influenced by this alienation, officers distrusted the public, doubting 
the ability of voters to communicate an “intelligent and informed opinion” to policy 
makers.
   
43  Further, some officers perceived the public as fickle and lacking the resolve 
to support global commitments or national defense.  Officers believed that public 
opinion had dictated the end of the war in Vietnam, and seemed likely to withdraw 
American forces worldwide back within the nation’s borders.44
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incapable of understanding the realities of geopolitics, some officer came to despise 
civilians and politicians, even while claiming they respected civilian control of the 
military apparatus.45
Some officers perceived that foreign policy developments and domestic politics 
might combine in the 1970s and 1980s to minimize American military expeditions 
abroad.  In their eyes, however, minimizing such expeditions did not mean eliminating 
them, and minimizing interventions would not end the loss of American life.  It was 
simply a fact of military life.
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  They believed that national interests were located 
overseas and, if not threatened by communist forces, nonetheless required military 
attention to ensure their security.  Such officers faced a dilemma as their perception of 
national interests conflicted with their perceptions of the American domestic political 
atmosphere.  Brigadier General Edward B. Atkeson summarized their views in a 1975 
article: “the clearest lesson gained from the [Vietnam] experience was that there is a 
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45 Peter Maslowski, “Army Values and American Values,” Military Review 70 (April 1990): 16, 20; A.J. 
Bacevich and Richard H. Kohn, “Grand Army of the Republicans,” New Republic (8 December 1997): 25; 
Kohn, “Out of Control,” 3-17; Kohn, “Upstarts in Uniform,” E19. 
46 Gard, “The Military and American Society,” 698; Raymond R. Battreall Jr., “Thesis: Massive Retaliation; 
Antithesis: Flexible Response; Synthesis: The Nixon Doctrine?” Military Review 55 (January 1975): 66; 
Atkeson, “International Crises and the Evolution of Strategy and Forces,” 47. 
 21 
expeditions abroad which is highly dependent upon perceptions of the acuity of the 
threat, the justice of the U.S. response and the prospects for prompt unequivocal 
success.”47
This threshold of tolerance became the object of further reflection among 
officers.
  Military action abroad, while particularly contentious and complicated, was 
not something these officers could plan to avoid.  Planning for operations overseas 
while remaining within both the threshold of American tolerance and the realistic limits 
imposed by a relatively modest-sized force intensified the challenge these officers 
faced.   
48  They feared that any war that did not begin with success and end promptly 
and conclusively critics would quickly call “another Vietnam.”  Influenced by their belief 
in the existence of a “Vietnam Syndrome,” military leaders feared the public would be 
quick to dissent during such an operation, and that the political establishment would be 
unwilling to commit forces in support of national interests.  Some worried that even a 
limited and finite intervention by military forces, such as in Lebanon two decades 
earlier, would be unfeasible because of “domestic and international opinion.”49
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During this time, the media claimed that the ever-mounting casualty toll played 
a significant role in American disaffection with the Vietnam War.50  Perhaps perceiving 
in this an attack on American military competence, officers maintained that casualties 
were an inescapable part of combat; that, in fact, “combat was a tough business in 
which only the best survive.”51
The October War fought in 1973 between Arabs and Israelis “was short, intense, 
violent, lethal, and almost the polar opposite of Vietnam.”
  By this claim, military officers distanced themselves 
further from greater society, refusing to acknowledge the affect losses had upon 
morale at home. The argument that combat was intrinsically bloody -- and should be 
accepted as such -- did not withstand the spectacle of war in the Middle East.  
52
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conflict of surrogates, matching Soviet technology and tactics wielded by the Arabs 
against Western technology in Israeli hands; in the process it demonstrated the U.S. 
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warfare.53  Americans extracted several distinct lessons from the Arab-Israeli War.  
Among these were the strain of continuous operations, the importance of mobility, the 
vulnerability of those less mobile, and the crucial value of the first engagement.  
Observers incorporated combined-arms capability, maintaining the initiative, and 
adopting a flexible defense into the new American understanding of mobility.  Officers 
writing new doctrine from 1973 to 1976 incorporated these lessons into the 
understanding of war they transmitted throughout the military.  Of these lessons, the 
costs of future war proved the simplest derived from the Yom Kippur War, and 
American officer’s observations of the casualty toll in Israel raised the question of when 
that cost would become excessive when measured in American lives.54
The number of American lives imperiled by future wars fought according to the 
lessons of the Yom Kippur War became particularly relevant with the 1973 transition to 
the All-Volunteer Force, a transition that also affected the development of doctrine.  
Reflecting on the decision to end conscription and make military service voluntary, 
Colonel Robert Gard commented, “there is probably a good deal of truth in the adage 
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that a democracy gets the military establishment it deserves.  The attitudes of 
American society will set the tone and general limits within which the armed forces can 
adjust.”55  The transformation to an all-volunteer force occasioned much discussion on 
the subject of manpower, including the risks to limited personnel resources posed by 
battle casualties.56
Some officers contended that transitioning to a military composed solely of 
volunteers would be a positive development, creating a more professional, motivated 
and efficient force.  Others feared exactly this outcome, combined with what they 
perceived as a trend toward partitioning the military from American society.  In a 1978 
article, Lieutenant Colonel Alfred H. Paddock, Jr., called on military leadership to “arrest 
this trend toward insularity.”
  
57  Throughout the decade officers who shared his opinion 
imagined that, without the draft’s wide-ranging impetus, the services would become 
increasingly elite, critical of and isolated from American society.58
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dire implications for the civil-military relationship.59  This was not a consensus opinion, 
however; still others argued that this isolation, a ‘turning-inward,’ would be beneficial.  
They perceived that after Vietnam a period of emotional distance would favor both the 
military and the nation.60
The practical problems created by the transition provoked the greatest anxiety.  
In 1970 the U.S. Army consisted of 1,293,276 soldiers; in the wake of Vietnam, officers 
feared that the military would be unable to recruit enough volunteers to fill its ranks, 
and those of the other services.
   
61  Even as the size of the military decreased this fear 
remained active, and the military complained of “insufficient numbers” and “low-
quality recruits.”62  Increased pay and benefits, combined with a loosening of some of 
the rigidity and discipline of military life composed part of the package assembled to 
persuade potential recruits that, indeed, “the Army Wants to Join You!”63
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memory of those losses posed the greatest obstacle to the transition, and, as the army 
lost the majority of those casualties that service faced the greatest challenge in 
transformation.  The oft-repeated mantra of “never again,” exclaimed to stave off 
involvement in another war like Vietnam, became a large part of the ultimate success.64  
However, could the American military avoid combat?  Some officers expressed the fear 
that an army without an enemy, an army always ready for a war that never came, 
would become restless; a restless military could pose a danger to the republic.65
The U.S. Army needed a new doctrine to address these issues.  Decreasing 
manpower, coupled with the absence of the draft, contributed, with a societal 
unwillingness to lose men to foreign wars, to suggest caution in future military 
operations.  However, officers recognized the need to protect national interests 
overseas and the need to demonstrate the willingness and ability to project force in the 
face of an enemy threat – particularly a threat as potent as that apparently offered by 
the Soviets.  The obvious solutions to these issues contradicted each other and so 
dictated compromise. 
  It is 
possible that later force-protection doctrines were born from the seed of this inherent 
conflict: a necessary force composed of scarce volunteers who must be conserved yet 
required combat in order to remain quiescent.  
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That compromise found life in the new doctrine epitomized in FM 100-5 
Operations.  Issued in 1976, it derived from the military-political environment of the 
decade.  It also reflected officers’ concerns about casualty aversion, drawing from the 
difficulty of the transformation to an all-volunteer force, and from the lessons learned 
through observation of the Arab-Israeli War.  The man most widely credited for 
engineering this new doctrine was General William E. DePuy.  Therefore, though FM 
100-5 and the doctrine it advanced benefitted from the collaboration of many minds, it 
can be examined and understood with reference to DePuy’s vision of war, his measures 
intended to address the problems posed by casualty aversion and the all-volunteer 
army, and his opponents and critics.66
DePuy’s experience with the 90th Infantry Division during World War II shaped 
his understanding of training, of preparing men and units for battle.  That war 
established the foundation of his understanding that the fire team and squad -- small 
units -- fought wars, and that, unless America was willing to overwhelm the enemy with 
numbers, those teams and squads needed to have better training and better 
equipment than the enemy.
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Army training frustrated him.  He perceived the nation to have been caught up in 
limited wars in Korea and Vietnam, wasting poorly trained soldiers under inadequate 
leadership – yet because of the nuclear arsenal of the Cold War, he, like other officers, 
saw no alternative to limited war.68
In DePuy’s view, the 1973 Arab-Israeli War “provided a marvelous excuse or 
springboard . . . for reviewing and updating our own doctrine.”
   
69  The Syrian and 
Egyptian campaign against Israel was brief, bloody and bitterly fought.  American 
military officers observed the hostilities with both fascination and horror.  The cost of 
the war entailed staggering losses in men and materiel, particularly when placed in 
context: DePuy argued that no American had considered Syria or Egypt a serious 
opponent on the Cold War battlefield.  Yet the Arabs managed to employ 3,000 artillery 
pieces, and lost almost 500 during the war.  As a point of comparison, DePuy 
emphasized that in 1973 the U.S. Army fielded roughly 500 artillery pieces in all of 
Europe.70  He observed the aftermath of the Arab-Israeli War and concluded that 
America, caught up in Vietnam for fifteen years, had failed to modernize its military.71
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DePuy employed the lessons he and his team extracted from the Arab-Israeli War as 
impetus for modernization. 
DePuy and his team distilled these lessons from observing the results of tank 
combat supported by infantry, artillery, close air support, and integrated air defense.  
One fundamental lesson emerged.  Modern war between relative equals involved 
weapons “vastly more lethal” than the weapons used in the past.  Hence the first to 
shoot was the most likely to win.  That principal alone rationalized development of 
optics and weaponry to enable gunners and riflemen to acquire and attack targets first 
– before themselves receiving fire.  The speed of combat had increased and mobility 
became integral to acquiring a position in order to take that first shot.  Supporting and 
defending the attacking tank element required an aggressive, “highly trained and highly 
skilled combined arms team.”  Again and again DePuy confronted a form of warfare 
that he described the American military, particularly the U.S. Army, as ill-prepared to 
wage.72
DePuy believed that tank warfare would decide conflicts on conventional 
battlefields for the foreseeable future. In his view, shared in NATO, Central Europe was 
the battlefield that mattered.  Applying the lessons from the Arab-Israeli War to that 
theatre forced several difficulties to the forefront.  Numbers seemed the most obvious.  
The Soviet force would vastly outnumber any American deployment to Europe.  This 
simple fact occasioned hard looks at the manpower expectations of the all-volunteer 
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force, at NATO’s political environment, and at American casualty sensitivity during the 
doctrinal development process.73
Officers in the U.S. Army attempted first to bridge that gap through new 
weaponry.  The now-familiar Big Five of the Abrams tank, Bradley mechanized infantry 
fighting vehicle, Apache and Blackhawk helicopters, and Patriot air defense system 
found their genesis in this attempt.  But the new weapons systems, requiring years to 
field, were not a complete answer.  DePuy and his team expanded upon the 
observation that the first to fire had the greater chance for success and demanded that 
the American force win the first battle of any future conflict.  They developed a 
doctrine, Active Defense, designed to allow the American military to flex and 
concentrate firepower through mobility and superior information to attain that initial 
victory.
  The American military had to find a way to be 
effective despite the disparity. 
74
Active Defense, codified in FM 100-5 Operations published in 1976, demanded 
much of the Americans positioned to face the Soviet military.  It codified a rigid 
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adherence to a system of force ratios, massed fires, and target servicing intended to 
achieve victory.  The doctrine could not guarantee victory, however; in DePuy’s eyes, 
“success in those early critical engagements will depend mostly upon the courage of 
our soldiers, the quality of our leaders and the excellence of our techniques and 
tactics.”75  The failure of any of these would be catastrophic.  If the American force 
received bad intelligence or made a mistake – or its nerve failed – it faced the choice of 
defending Western Europe to the last man or trading some of Europe to save casualties 
and gain time.76  Perhaps in their own statement on the choice, officers and men in 
these units began referring to themselves as “speed bumps on the way to the Rhine.”77
The new army that coalesced around FM 100-5 after 1976 struggled to deal with 
its role in Europe, the aftermath of Vietnam and the transition to a volunteer force.  
Caught between the demands of society and the mission, DePuy actually lamented, “If 
there was ever an army that needed an alternative to the long, thin line with its high 
casualties and dubious prospects it is the weapons-intensive, manpower-starved, all-
volunteer Army.”
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characterization, arguing instead that the operational commander decided how to use 
the doctrine, and that the doctrine did not dictate warfare by attrition.  Such a mandate 
would have been unsustainable due both to the numbers available and to the political 
climate post-Vietnam. Indeed, DePuy often promoted a mobile and flexible defense 
coupled with overwhelming firepower on the grounds of preventing casualties.79
DePuy believed that casualties often derived directly from poor leadership, and 
advocated removing incompetent commanders and seasoning the more competent.  
He wrote, “The secret to success lies in the selection and training of leaders before the 
first battle so that the seasoning process can stay ahead of the casualty process.  When 
the opposite happens . . . a downward spiral occurs and the resultant disaster is a 
producer of mass casualties without any offsetting contribution to the war effort.”
   
80  
Much of the training regimen that DePuy and his cadre developed in concert with FM 
100-5 began this seasoning process.  He coupled this with a near-mania for effective 
training at all levels within the service, also often on the grounds of conserving the 
force.81
Given its limited numbers available, the U.S. Army could only tolerate a certain 
proportion of losses before being unable to fight.  Most armies engaged in such 
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battlefield arithmetic; the prospect of defending the breadth of Europe against Soviet 
might certainly occasioned it.  In keeping with his belief in the importance of the 
smallest unit on the battlefield, DePuy believed the effects of casualties at the 
microscopic level could be as damaging as at the national level.  Society’s reaction was 
ultimately as important as the effectiveness of the deployed force, however; DePuy 
worried over engagements on the modern battlefield that could engender “losses for 
which we are not prepared either in materiel or psychologically.”82  In his doctrine he 
perceived there might be a need to trade space in order to avoid excessive casualties, 
despite the political repercussions, saying that in certain situations “the defenders have 
the choice of expending themselves in place or . . . trading a little space for time and 
casualties.”83  A product of his generation, DePuy nevertheless understood the 
inevitability of casualties in combat; he determined to minimize them in the course of 
carrying out the mission.  DePuy’s Active Defense doctrine embodied that 
determination to limit American casualties.84
The officers who developed the 1976 doctrine kept in mind the composition of 
the force.  Active Defense called for a highly trained and highly skilled combined arms 
team conducting complicated maneuvers to a precise timetable.  The officers 
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developing doctrine believed, however, that the current volunteer force lacked a 
sufficient number of motivated and intelligent soldiers.  DePuy’s writing references the 
need to simplify concepts in order to communicate them to soldiers, in hopes that they 
would understand – because he believed confusion bred casualties and that even 
minimal complexity could confuse soldiers and wreak havoc among front-line units.85
The officers who criticized DePuy’s doctrine seldom found fault in his 
understanding of soldiers.  Instead these critics found fault with DePuy’s vision of war.  
The major complaints fell into two categories.  First: that it neglected moral issues, such 
as courage, initiative, and determination.  Critics noted that Active Defense ignored this 
aspect of combat as it related both to the American force and to the enemy.  Second: 
the doctrine utilized only conventional tactics and techniques primarily inspired by the 
Arab-Israeli War.  Special units and unconventional methods possessed no role in the 
Active Defense. 
  
In 1977, Lieutenant Colonel Donald Vought addressed what he perceived as the 
doctrine’s failure to consider the enemy’s political will.  He criticized FM 100-5’s explicit 
emphasis on winning the first battle without addressing the enemy’s own resolve to 
fight on to victory.  Vought argued that without planning to target the enemy’s political 
will the American military deluded itself by planning to win the first battle of, in his 
view, an unlikely war between major powers.  The implications disturbed Vought.  
Without addressing the intangibles of political and popular support the ‘battlefield 
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calculus’ used in FM 100-5 could not accurately predict the duration of the anticipated 
war, much less the grinding war of attrition Vought felt more likely to take place.  He 
feared an expectation for quick victory that could, in its turn, lead to shattered 
American morale if the war persisted.  More importantly, Vought asserted that the 
authors’ of Active Defense failure to consider resolve and will exposed weaknesses in 
the American military, which an enemy could exploit. In this sense, the American 
disregard for the possibilities presented by waging war on morale or incorporating 
methods of unconventional warfare appeared dangerous and neglectful.86
In a 1978 article, Major David Schlacter and Major Fred Stubbs identified Active 
Defense’s neglect of unconventional war as dangerous. In their view, the doctrinal 
emphasis on conventional and nuclear conflict was simply “the tip of the iceberg.”  
Successfully executing a campaign using Active Defense required significantly more, in 
their minds, than tanks and missiles.  Specifically, these officers discounted the 
prospect of winning the first battle – out-numbered, deployed abroad, and dependent 
on virtually impossible “perfect intelligence” – unless the United States used Special 
Forces to promulgate unconventional warfare.  Essentially, while FM 100-5 gave scant 
mention to Vietnam, these officers promoted the incorporation of the lessons learned 
in that conflict as well as those learned from the Arab-Israeli War.
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In a letter to General Walter T. Kerwin, Jr., at the end of the 1970s, DePuy 
wrote, “The next ten years are critical for the Army.  We are playing catch-up on 
modernization, having missed one generation of modernization during the Vietnam 
War -- modernization in weapons and equipment -- modernization in tactics and 
techniques -- modernization in training methodology and effectiveness. . . .  Preparing 
for war is the only justification for a large peacetime army.”88  DePuy expected another 
war at the end of the 1980s and this expectation motivated his efforts to reform 
America’s idea of “how to fight.” 89
DePuy’s efforts faced considerable obstacles in the contemporary political and 
social environment.  The public’s dissatisfaction with the course of the war in Vietnam 
had created an atmosphere easily perceived to be anti-war and perhaps anti-military.  
The societal and cultural dissatisfaction with the number of casualties produced over 
the course of the war was one aspect of this atmosphere.  The military also desired to 
set aside the experiences of Vietnam.  Even had this not been the case, the armed 
forces had to deal with a smaller pool of bodies from which to draw.  Officers observed 
that the end of the draft forced the services to change their image and the message 
they delivered to the populace – and a part of that had to include some measure of 
reassurance, minimizing the prospect of death in the line of duty.  This became more 
difficult when the Arab-Israeli War demonstrated what Americans could expect of a 
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NATO-Warsaw Pact struggle in Central Europe. American officers struggled to reconcile 
the amilitaristic and casualty-averse domestic political environment with what they 
believed to be the nature of the next war.90
In 1978 columnist George Will wrote, “Even before the Vietnam war ended, 
wise people warned that the ‘lessons’ Americans would choose to draw from the war 
would be as dangerous as the war itself.”
  Officers attempted to resolve these 
problems through the doctrine of Active Defense, relying on advanced technology, 
intelligence, and concentration of firepower to limit casualties.  Their perception of 
American casualty aversion influenced the development not only of military officers’ 
vision of future war but of the doctrine devised to wage that war.   
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  Officers derived many lessons from 
Vietnam that they applied to the policy and doctrine of the 1970s.  Among them, the 
lesson teaching that the American people reacted reflexively and negatively to military 
casualties seemed perhaps only one of many.  It would gain in importance as the 1970s 
gave way to the 1980s. 
91 George Will, “The Enduring Cold War,” Newsweek, 15 May 1978, 116. 
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CHAPTER III 
CONFLICT INTENSITY IN THE 1980s 
 
This chapter argues that American military officers in the 1980s believed public 
support for military operations was necessary and that casualties threatened that 
support; that these officers believed the American public was casualty averse, even 
while (for the most part) excepting the military men themselves.  The military 
operations of the decade, particularly the U.S. Marine’s service in Lebanon, contribute 
to a discussion that revolves around doctrine and military culture – particularly the idea 
of “warrior spirit.”  Both doctrine and culture reflected the challenges of dealing not 
only with the still-unproven volunteer system but also with the American involvement 
in what officers described as “low intensity conflicts” during the Cold War.  Much of the 
officers’ professional discussion reflected the challenge of succeeding in low intensity 
conflicts without alienating the public and while coping with a doctrine and 
organization predicated upon a major war with the Soviet Union.  American officers 
focused upon this potential conflict, and with rolling back the Soviet threat.  War 
planners developed a complicated relationship with the European plains of the Central 
Region, even as other wars, less suited to the American predilection for large-scale 
conventional warfare, dominated the geopolitical landscape. 
In their own forums, American military officers discussed the affects of 
casualties upon the society to which they owed their loyalty.  In that debate, they 
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considered the impact of casualties upon the American military’s means and methods 
of waging war.  This discussion took place in the turmoil of the early 1980s.  Public 
failures such as that of Operation Eagle Claw in 1980, the attempt to rescue American 
diplomats held in Iran, increased scrutiny on the military.  Critics from both within and 
without the armed forces, many of them influential academics, characterized the 
military during these early years as “hollow” and questioned its competence.  One 
aspect of that hollowness involved the leadership’s struggle with a number of the 
intangible aspects of command, such as values.92
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  Scholars, commentators and officers 
observed that the military had become overly bureaucratic, overly corporate, and that 
the nation’s military leaders had departed from their calling as warriors to embrace a 
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managerial role.  General DePuy, retired and reminiscing in 1984 observed, “an army 
devoted to an endless bloodless ballet does not inspire much confidence.”93
The occasionally heated discussion over the conflict between a warrior’s and a 
manager’s role touched on many aspects of intra-military conflict during the decade, 
including competence, doctrine and equipment.
  The 
increasingly corporate military organization had fostered leaders who favored a more 
managerial leadership style, perhaps at the expense of emphasizing the American 
warrior spirit. 
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  One of the most strident discussions 
concerned the integral nature of the military as the body responsible for killing the 
nation’s enemies and, perhaps, dying in the attempt.  Observers of the military noted a 
subtle departure from this requisite of warfare.  One such observer, retired army 
officer Fred Downs, blamed the military’s disassociation from killing on the death toll of 
Vietnam.  In his point of view, “killing is the Army’s major function during war.  Yet it is 
the least understood, most ignored, and least discussed aspect of a young officer’s 
training as a platoon leader. . . . We understood and expected that some of our men 
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Win,” Parameters 16 (Autumn 1986): 79-80; Linn, Echo of Battle, 196-200. 
 41 
would be killed.  But no one taught us what would happen to us.”95 Other officers 
widened the failure of the military’s professional education system to include soldiers 
of all ranks.  They collectively asserted that the men in the military were not instructed 
in death – what it was like to cause it nor how to deal with it when it affected their unit.  
Some suggested that Americans in general were psychologically unready for a war that 
caused them to confront its casualties.96
The Vietnam War had brought Americans face-to-face with their dead, and the 
military continued to deal with the lingering effects of that war in the 1980s. Many 
military officers had blamed the American failure in Vietnam on the popular opposition, 
and at least as many had blamed the media for exposing the populace to the bloody 
vagaries of war, without emphasizing the strategic purpose of stopping Communist 
expansion – the strategy at the heart of the Cold War.
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Mandelbaum studied the “widely believed [theory] that . . . the United States lost the 
war because it was televised,” exposing the public to the ugly reality of battle.  His 
study, published in 1983, coupled with others – including the U.S. Army’s official history 
– found that the theory of media hijacking public support did “not stand up to 
scrutiny.”  Rather, “the United States lost the war in Vietnam because the American 
public was not willing to pay the cost of winning, or avoiding losing.”98  Casualties, and 
particularly excessive casualties, appeared to be the responsibility of the professional 
military. Suffering such casualties in combat with such a technological advantage, and 
so losing the support of the American people, spoke directly to the competence of the 
American military.  The military could not expect the full faith and confidence of the 
public if it failed to protect its own members.99
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If the public weighed the costs of a military operation against its perceived 
value, what costs were acceptable?  The Army War College’s journal, Parameters, asked 
if “the preservation of the Union and the end of slavery [were] worth one million dead 
and wounded Americans?  Was the defeat of Nazism commensurate with the loss of 55 
million lives?  The principle of proportionality cannot be quantified.”100  The question 
prompted discussion of just how to predict casualties, as well; even in situations similar 
to past operations, too many variables existed to determine the cost of a future 
mission.101
Officers found themselves forced to consider what political objectives in the 
Cold War era merited such societal effort and sacrifice.  One response proposed in a 
1981 article that the citizenry required concrete gains in national interest to rationalize 
American deaths – in fact, that “there must exist a reasonable probability of success 
achievable at costs proportionate to the importance of the end sought.”
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  Some 
officers absorbed that the American public required a tangible benefit rather than an 
ideological “greater good” to support a bloody war.  
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Academics eagerly addressed this cost-benefit analysis.  Political scientist 
Samuel P. Huntington claimed that American politicians were reluctant to use the 
military in the 1980s, particularly in low-intensity conflict situations, because they 
feared the military lacked competence. Such fears reflected the heritage of Vietnam 
and the bungled Iran hostage rescue and drew upon the perception that the public 
would quickly disavow any military operation they believed wasted American lives.103  
Reaching similar conclusions – though likely following a different rationale – military 
officers also increased the emphasis they placed on popular support.  According to a 
1982 article by Colonel William O. Staudenmaier, this increased emphasis produced “an 
imbalance wherein professional judgment has given way to political expediency,” 
creating an environment in which the demands of war fighting – or even preparation 
for war – were subordinated to the exigencies of public opinion.104
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  Such an 
environment affected an officer culture already prone to careerism and a zero-
tolerance mentality, resulting in a shying-away from the risks of unsupported combat.  
Journalist Charley Reese, after a 1983 assignment at the U.S. Army War College, 
observed, “The military is loath to the nth degree to get involved in any operation that 
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does not have the 100 percent support of the American people.”105  Casualties seemed 
particularly relevant to many as, over the course of the decade, the official U.S. Army 
position came to be that excessive casualties were responsible for the loss of public 
support for the war in Vietnam.106
Such perceptions could not help but have an effect on recruitment, training and 
doctrine within the military.  The maintenance of the All-Volunteer Force affected the 
U.S. Army’s effort to cultivate resilient public support in unexpected ways.  Since the 
end of the draft, the service had striven to cultivate an image attractive to potential 
recruits, and it continued to struggle in the 1980s.  Captain Samuel J. Barlotta argued in 
a 1980 Military Review article that “making death and self-sacrifice look appealing is 
virtually impossible, so the Army is being sold under the pretense that it is a 
comfortable job instead of a demanding profession.”
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proved impossible as well. 
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During the 1980s, the Cold War seemed poised to call upon Americans to make 
just that sacrifice for military power.  Officers discussed the prospect of war with the 
Soviet Union with obsession.  In General John R. Galvin’s words, “We continue to show 
our fascination with the ever-increasing conventional and nuclear power of the Soviet 
Union – focusing almost exclusively on our potential opponent’s capability to fight a 
massive high-intensity war in Western Europe.”108  Some officers attributed the threat 
posed by the Soviets to the number and quality of soldiers available to the Warsaw 
Pact.109  Other officers posited that the crux of the conflict was not that the Soviets 
possessed too many soldiers but that the Americans possessed too few.  General Donn 
A. Starry, reviewing the decade, summarized the problem: “Inherent in the changing 
force balance was the unpleasant truth that no longer could we guarantee numerical 
superiority, even with the help of allies. So our whole concept, of mass conscript armies 
and mass industrial means to support battles of military and national annihilation, 
came to be at risk.”110 Further, the cost of such a clash, in treasure, equipment, and 
most importantly lives was a colossal burden.111
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die within three months.  Some 20,000,000 might die in a war in Europe.112  The 
prospect of presenting such a toll to the American people was intimidating; the fear 
was that such a war would become necessary yet lack popular support, so long as it 
remained overseas.  Some officers drew comfort however by noting that fighting the 
wars of the 20th century without the support of the majority of the population had 
been the norm rather than the exception; only the military efforts in World War II had 
enjoyed the support of the majority from beginning to end.113
Given the potential for such enormous losses, General DePuy understandably 
lamented in 1986, “Attrition, the dirtiest word in current U.S. Army doctrine, is warmly 
embraced by the Soviet Army.”
  Despite the recent 
trend, the costs of bloody war had not always required popular approval. 
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  Officers studying Soviet military doctrine anticipated 
that the Soviet leaders would happily engage in an exchange of casualties with the 
United States’ forces.  The Soviet advantage in numbers, and its social structure, 
permitted war by attrition while American officers expected their own society would 
protest.  This factor combined with changing force ratios, the dissatisfaction with a 
managerial officer corps and the perceived importance of popular support for all extra-
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territorial military operations to influence the development of doctrine in the 1980s.  
Active Defense fell as the first victim of these doctrinal changes. 
Active Defense emanated from the first Training and Doctrine Command as 
Field Manual 100-5 Operations (1976).  It proposed to use mechanized forces and 
technological advances to enable the numerically disadvantaged American forces to 
win a battle against a Soviet enemy.  Active Defense relied upon the idea that the first 
battle would in fact decide the war, and focused its efforts on massing firepower from a 
defensive position against an attacking enemy.115
After a few years of operating within the doctrine, select officers criticized 
Active Defense for what they perceived as an emphasis upon attrition warfare.  From 
that perspective, officers noted with disfavor the means by which the Active Defense 
attempted to ameliorate the risks to manpower, relying upon a prepared defense and 
superior firepower to lessen the costs of combat attrition.  Overwhelming firepower, in 
this argument, allowed the American forces to wage a war of attrition even while facing 
overwhelming numbers of men.  In a parallel argument, fighting from a prepared 
defense allowed the army to engage in the slugfest of firepower and avoided the high 
risks and potentially high gains of maneuver warfare.  Based on these criticisms, officers 
called for a revised doctrine. 
 
Other officers contested the need for a doctrine to replace Active Defense.  
General DePuy responded to critics of Active Defense, arguing in 1980: “Just because 
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we have studied Soviet doctrine exhaustively, we must not sanctify his intentions nor 
assign his tactics an aura of inevitable success. A well-situated, well-supported U.S. tank 
or mech[anized] company with ten to 15 high-performance tank and antitank weapons 
[using Active Defense] should be able to destroy a Soviet tank battalion coming straight 
at it nine times out of ten with moderate losses.”116
Proponents of maneuver warfare, among the critics of Active Defense, noted 
the requirement in DePuy’s argument for a Soviet frontal assault that suggested the 
Soviets would neglect their own operational maneuvers.  Lieutenant Colonel Paul T. 
Devries likewise protested, observing in 1982 that the U.S. military “cannot match 
firepower with the Soviets so we must be smarter to establish combat ratios favorable 
to us at decisive points. Proper positioning of forces in relation to the enemy frequently 
can achieve results which otherwise could be achieved only at a heavy cost in men and 
materiel.”
   
117  Devries drew from a broad palette of inspiration to address the 
shortcomings in Active Defense and advocated reemphasizing maneuver in doctrine 
rather than firepower from a prepared defense.118
Based on many of these same critiques, senior officers criticized the doctrine of 
Active Defense and commanders distrusted it.  Many advocated emphasizing maneuver 
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warfare rather than firepower.119  The result was two revisions of the U.S. Army’s 
primary field manual, FM 100-5, one published in 1982 and one in 1986.  Lieutenant 
Colonel Huba Wass de Czege and Lieutenant Colonel L.D. Holder, two of the 
contributors to FM 100-5 Operations (1982), claimed in an article published the same 
year that the “doctrine [of Active Defense] was changed [because] Army commanders 
became convinced . . . that they would be unable to defeat the Soviets using the 
[previous] doctrine.”120  FM 100-5 (1982) was a swing of the pendulum in the direction 
of maneuver, creating the doctrine of AirLand Battle.  Rather than emphasizing 
technology and firepower used from a prepared defense, AirLand Battle emphasized 
technology and firepower wielded in attacks deep into enemy territory to “fight the 
Soviets – or any other adversary.”121
Another debate emerged within the larger framework of the discussion over 
Active Defense and AirLand Battle.  In this debate proponents of firepower and 
maneuver within and without the military voiced their opinions.  Try as they might, 
neither group could avoid using the term “attrition.”  Strongly associated with General 
William Westmoreland’s strategy in Vietnam, the term aroused such distaste that 
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General Dave R. Palmer declared, “Attrition is not a strategy. It is irrefutable proof of 
the absence of any strategy.  A commander who resorts to attrition admits his failure to 
conceive of an alternative.”122  DePuy in 1984 described attrition as “such an ‘ugly’ 
doctrine that it claims no known or announced adherents, even though most wars 
finally have been resolved on that basis.”123 Perhaps this attitude, coupled with the 
recognition that the American military lacked the resources to pursue a strategy of 
attrition through to resolution, lent credence to the criticism of Active Defense.124
Proponents of maneuver doctrine rejoiced upon the codification of AirLand 
Battle.  These officers claimed that it was their objective “to break the spirit and will of 
the enemy command by creating surprising and dangerous operations or strategic 
situations,” and argued further that a doctrine based on maneuver would minimize 
casualties.
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the argument a step further.  He did not criticize the United States’ technological 
emphasis, which formed the crux of the American attempt to overcome the manpower 
shortfall, but argued instead that both sides of the Cold War battlefield wielded “large 
numbers of modern weapon systems” and “sophisticated electronic warfare means.”  
Starry came to the conclusion that no single weapons system would bring victory but 
that such an outcome would be dependent on “factors other than numbers.”126
The emphasis on such intangible aspects of leadership remains particularly 
apparent in FM 100-5 (1982).  The authors agreed with DePuy, a critic of AirLand Battle, 
that this first revision pushed doctrine further from firepower than was, in their view, 
necessary.  As DePuy argued, it was “possible to be ‘for’ maneuver without being 
‘against’ firepower. This is a pendulum that needs to be pushed back and promptly. It is 
possible to be ‘for’ the offense without being ‘against’ the defense.”
  
Therefore, AirLand Battle required a return to emphasis of the very “warrior” qualities 
officers perceived as lacking in American military leadership. 
127
                                                 
126 Starry, “A Perspective on American Military Thought,” 8-9; Galloway, “FM 100-5: Who Influenced 
Whom?” 48-49; Combest, “Building the Will to Fight,” 4; Wayne A. Downing, “Training to Fight,” Military 
Review 66 (March 1986): 19, 25. 
 In the 
meantime, however, FM 100-5 (1982) advocated “speed, surprise, maneuver, and 
decisive action,” noting that on a lethal battlefield success had to be achieved early and 
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conviction, initiative, endurance, innovation and genius sufficient to create combat 
power by substituting massed fire for massed troops.128  Given such requirements, 
DePuy described AirLand Battle as “a doctrine that would be perfectly understood and 
beautifully executed by commanders cut in the mold of a General George S. Patton Jr. 
or a General Matthew B. Ridgway; but there are only a few of them, and the rest of us 
vary widely in imagination, resolve and risk tolerance.”129
AirLand Battle’s ambiguous definition of victory itself reinforced DePuy’s 
criticism.  FM 100-5 (1982) stated that “destroying the enemy’s fighting force is the 
only sure way of winning,” urging attacks aimed to “avoid the enemy’s main strength 
but shatter the will of the defending commander or reduce the fighting capability of his 
troops” as “the fastest and cheapest way of winning.”
  The implication was that the 
military’s current crop of officer-managers was unable to meet the demands that 
maneuver victory required of officer-warriors. 
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  Yet General William R. 
Richardson admitted in a 1986 article that AirLand Battle failed to address strategic 
victory.  As an operational and tactical doctrine, it focused on the battle, rather than 
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and is professional nonsense,” but he ascribed final responsibility for ultimate strategic 
victory to the political administration.131
In the middle of the decade, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command further 
revised military doctrine.  Field Manual 100-5 Operations (1986) opened its discussion 
of AirLand Battle doctrine by stating that: “The overriding mission of U.S. forces is to 
deter war.”
 
132  Perhaps in the era of deterrence this seemed a reasonable statement.  
Yet Major David Petraeus pointed out in an article for Parameters in 1986 that the U.S. 
Army was involved in violent low-intensity conflicts in El Salvador, Chad, Columbia, 
Ecuador, Honduras, Morocco, Peru, the Philippines, Sudan, and Thailand, and that 
further involvement in small wars was unavoidable.133  It seems plausible that the 
writers of FM 100-5 (1986) were aware of American military involvement around the 
world, which suggests that they directed the manual’s opening statement regarding 
deterrence toward the long-anticipated war with the Soviet Union.134
The doctrinal decision to focus on deterrence rather than wage a conventional 
war with the Soviets did not prevent the Army from training for a conventional conflict.  
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The training evoked concerns, however, as, in 1988, the Center for Army Lessons 
Learned (CALL) “discovered that too many tank and mechanized infantry battalion 
commanders were being ‘killed’ in training exercises, after which their units 
deteriorated and were trounced in battle.”  Key losses among these units, the study 
demonstrated, could lead to casualties on a much greater scale.  Research disclosed 
that this military problem had troubled mobile units for more than a century.135  Given 
the hundred-plus years the military struggled with it, the problem seemed insoluble.  
Alternatively, because of the likelihood of the mode of warfare such training exercises 
prepared for, the actual importance of the problem seemed negligible.  General Galvin 
reiterated the vanishingly small possibility that the Cold War would birth a conventional 
clash in Western Europe and urged the American military to turn its attention to the 
Third World as the actual theatre of conflict.136
Officers encountered some trouble applying AirLand Battle to the low-intensity 
conflicts typical in these regions.  The doctrine gave responsibility for all 
unconventional war to the Special Forces and mentioned that unconventional forces 
could be valuable in the deep attack.
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  Otherwise, the doctrine’s drafters expected 
that AirLand Battle would adapt to fit any form of war, assuming in a way similar to 
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senior army officers of the late 19th and early 20th century that an aggressive small-unit 
leader could meet the challenges low-intensity combat presented.138
Throughout the 1980s, it was true that, in the words of Secretary of Defense 
James Schlesinger, “The likeliest physical challenges to the United States come in the 
Third World – not in Europe or North America.”
   
139 This geographic certainty changed 
more than the location of the threat – in the eyes of many officers, it changed the 
nature of the threat.  Some expected perhaps to face Soviet surrogates in Third World 
countries; more, however, expected to engage in low-intensity conflict.140
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Officer’s definition of low-intensity conflict ranged from acts of terrorism to 
“total war at the grass roots level.”141  Low-intensity conflict did not preclude sustained 
clashes between regular forces but rather de-emphasized the importance of the 
military aspect of warfare.  Some officers dismissed this form of warfare in the very 
terms used to describe it: low-intensity conflict, military operations other than war, 
and, in a case like Vietnam, the “other war;” such disparagement was used to argue 
that the army should focus on conventional war, along the lines of World War II.  
Officers closer to the “front” of unconventional war contended that low-intensity 
warfare used “all of the weapons of total war, including political, economic and 
psychological warfare,” and would be the prevalent form of war in the future.142
It was perhaps fortunate that during the decade American officers were able to 
observe a sustained low-intensity conflict by the Soviets in Afghanistan and study the 
tactics of both insurgent and counterinsurgent.  Some observed that the Soviet Army’s 
focus on tank warfare developed for the European plains inhibited its 
counterinsurgency methods, a problem that might also apply to the U.S. Army.
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Spanning the decade, the Soviet struggle in Afghanistan provided American officers two 
particularly relevant foci for the discussion of unconventional war: casualties and 
popular support.  Comparisons between American involvement in Vietnam and Soviet 
operations in Afghanistan were unavoidable.  Against what some described as a “classic 
guerrilla force,” the Soviet Army in 1979 deployed between 105,000 and 120,000 
conventional forces, supplemented with an estimated 160,000 Afghanis on the Soviet 
payroll in either a military or paramilitary capacity.  According to one estimate, 85,000 
to 100,000 “freedom fighters” stymied this massive Soviet force.  Few of the Soviet 
attempts to “win hearts and minds” prospered as the Afghan government they installed 
floundered, economic efforts failed, and the skilled Afghans needed to develop the 
country fled with the rest of the refugees.  As Major Joseph J. Collins observed, only the 
insurgency prospered.  After two years, he tallied 15,000 Soviet casualties, killed or 
wounded, and after four years, he estimated the Soviets had lost 20,000 troops in 
combat with perhaps an equal number lost to disease.  When the Soviet force 
withdrew in February 1989, the total stood at 11,897 battle deaths; the war directly 
caused an estimated 1,300,000 Afghan deaths.144
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As damaging to morale as the attrition must have been to the Soviet forces, 
worse still was the rate of desertion.  Particularly damning was the mode – many 
southwest Asians from the Soviet Union or Afghanis from the Soviet-sponsored military 
deserted to join the insurgent forces.  American officers observed that the Soviet 
government made efforts to limit the news of casualties from reaching their domestic 
press.  Major Terry L. Heyns noted in 1981, “Soviet management of the Afghan 
intervention goes beyond the media” and discussed the treatment of Soviet wounded 
at facilities far from the metropolis.  The USSR buried Soviet dead within its own 
borders – but not in the deceased’s own local cemeteries.  The Soviet public never 
received news of deserters changing their allegiance; “in this way, the Soviet 
authorities can further mitigate the impact of the war at home.”145
American officers struggled throughout the decade to come to grips with the 
domestic relationships among casualties, media coverage, and public opinion.  This was 
evident in the officers’ discussion concerning the intervention in Lebanon, the largest 
casualty-producing operation of the 1980s.  Expecting to be engaged in low-intensity 
  The Soviet method 
of dealing with public opinion, casualties, and media coverage provided a case study for 
American observers, but few answers. 
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combat throughout the decade, few officers discussed its costs in terms of casualties.  
Rather, they discussed it in terms of maintaining popular support – with the 
understanding that the populace would not willingly suffer casualties for a conflict that 
was not determined to be worth the cost. 
Lebanon provided an apt example of this public support phenomenon.  On 23 
October 1983, a truck loaded with explosives entered the American consular facility at 
the Beirut International Airport.  Two-hundred forty-one Americans died in the 
explosion.146  Parameters published an article a year later observing that the press 
coverage following the attack focused much more on the possible political 
repercussions than on the military questions surrounding the attack.147  Commensurate 
with the political emphasis, President Ronald Reagan authorized the withdrawal of 
American forces by March 1984 in anticipation of a decline in popular support.  This 
withdrawal occurred despite a 21 percent increase in public approval for the mission 
following the attack – the “rally-around-the-flag” phenomenon.148
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Lebanon resulted in failure and defeat not because of military incompetence or an 
inability to achieve the operational aims, but because of American casualties.  In his 
argument, the 256 total battle casualties suffered in Lebanon proved too great for 
American politicians to risk, increasing the chances of public disapproval.149
Officers meanwhile argued that the military leadership had opposed sending 
Marines to Lebanon initially, and offered only a weak argument that it would be 
“unpalatable” to withdraw them in accord with the administration’s direction.  These 
officers discussed their perceptions of the public’s cost-benefit analysis with respect to 
Lebanon, however, and recommended that the U.S. government find “alternative 
means to achieve U.S. objectives in Lebanon” which would “reduce the risk” to troops.  
The official report on the attack commissioned by the Department of Defense 
emphasized “how” the enemy attacked the barracks, rather than “why,” perhaps 
indicating an organizational inclination toward force-protection.
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The factors that influenced policy-making in Lebanon similarly influenced 
American involvement in low-intensity conflict throughout the decade.  Officers such as 
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Major Gilbert S. Harper predicted more deployments similar to Operation Urgent Fury 
in Grenada in 1983 – a phenomenon he termed “no-plan wars.”151  The term “no-plan 
war” described an American military reaction to an urgent perceived need, 
characterized in Grenada by the tensions over communist influence in the Caribbean 
exacerbated by the collapse of Grenada’s government and internal turmoil, even 
military rule.  American forces intervened twelve days after dissidents toppled the legal 
government of Grenada, and suffered nineteen casualties – only nine of them to hostile 
fire.152
The rapid response in Grenada posed a contrast to the development of 
Operation Just Cause in Panama, the other successful operation of the 1980s.  Instead 
of a twelve day planning and preparation period, the United States Department of 
Defense began planning contingency operations and increasing the available forces 
nearly two years before the 1989 invasion.
  Describing Operation Urgent Fury in terms of speed and costs placed it as a 
standard of sorts in the ongoing discussion among American officers concerning the 
model of future war.   
153
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  The two operations, in Grenada and in 
Panama, provided ends to the spectrum developed by American officers in their debate 
over future wars.  The intervention in Grenada, quick and reactive, responded to a 
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suddenly perceived -- and potential -- threat with ideological motivation; the 
intervention in Panama addressed an area with inherent American national security 
interest and a less clearly perceived threat.  American officers in their debate 
attempted to create a framework with which to address future wars which fell within 
the spectrum defined by Grenada at one end and Panama at the other; both ends, 
then, notable for their lack of casualties. 
Even after the success of Panama and Grenada officers struggled with the 
ongoing American intervention in unconventional wars and low-intensity conflicts.  The 
breadth and scope of conflict throughout the Third World suggested that the American 
military would have a great variety of operations and minimal time to prepare for 
them.  Such an outlook, for many observers, implied that Harper’s argument for “no-
plan wars” merited further consideration, and that such consideration was the United 
States’ responsibility.  Many observers, military officers, analysts and commentators 
asserted that America had the “worldwide interests, worldwide vulnerability, and 
worldwide strategic mobility” to require and maintain global stability.154
Officers perceived that the questions of how many troops could be politically 
risked, and what costs the United States public would tolerate, became more important 
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in these operations than determining the requirements for victory.  In some cases this 
resulted in congressional limitations on the number of Americans permitted to be 
involved in a low-intensity conflict, and it did not fail to highlight a weakness in the 
United States’ civil-military relationship – a weakness many officers feared would be 
exploited.155  Involved in El Salvador throughout the decade, the American military was 
congressionally constrained to fifty-five advisers.  In Nicaragua “the effective 
orchestration of U.S. public opinion by sympathetic interest and front groups” made its 
“impact on congressional security assistance support.”156
Congressional reluctance to provide military manpower to these areas was 
symptomatic of a trend away from involvement in low-intensity conflict. For many 
military officers the discussion of unconventional war ventured too far into the gray.  
General John Vessey said as much, stating for an article in 1984, “I am absolutely, 
unalterably opposed to risking American lives for some sort of military and political 
objectives that we don’t understand.”
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Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger delivered what would become the 
Weinberger Doctrine in 1984.  In it, he asserted that “the most likely challenge to the 
peace” would arise in the type of “gray area conflicts” democracies were little inclined 
to support.  He called on Americans to support efforts in these low-intensity conflicts.  
Weinberger also proposed consulting six tests before deploying troops overseas.  These 
tests emphasized that the mission be one “vital to [American] national interests” and 
assured of support by both the American people and politicians.158
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  According to 
Samuel Huntington, “Weinberger declared that he was focusing on the problem of 
using U.S. military force in gray area conflicts, but he then defined criteria which would, 
if applied with only modest vigor, virtually limit the use of those forces to the defense 
of U.S. territory.”  Defining what may be termed the “traditional viewpoint,” 
Huntington declared that “the military do not want to act because they fear the 
absence of public support,” arguing “that Secretary Weinberger has it backward: public 
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support is not the prerequisite for successful military action; successful and decisive 
military action is the prerequisite for popular support.”159
The uniformed military position was more ambiguous. General Galvin reflected, 
“Warfare is . . . no longer fought simply by the military.  It now encompasses entire 
populations, large or small, sophisticated or developing, and its outcome depends more 
and more on their collective will, what Clausewitz termed the ‘popular passions,’ the 
compelling motivation and defiant attitude of the people upon whose commitment and 
readiness to make personal sacrifices military power ultimately depends.”
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  The task 
of keeping the public informed and supportive of wars large and small was daunting. 
Officers worried about national security and about stabilizing the media-military 
relationship that many persisted in believing a source of defeat rather than a necessary 
tool of victory.  In the past, only in a major war such as World War II, where the very 
survival of the United States was arguably threatened, was the value of victory evident 
enough to bear the costs such victory required.  Some officers did not believe every 
future military operation was going to be so clear, and so able to garner the support 
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that the Weinberger Doctrine required.161
Looking back over the decade, a strange disconnect existed between the 
“Hollow Army” of the 1980s and the doctrinal transition from Active Defense to AirLand 
Battle.  The critics who described the service as hollow claimed that the military 
leadership had adopted a bureaucratic, managerial style.  Warrior leaders were in short 
supply and much in need.  Yet AirLand Battle, adopted and refined throughout the 
decade, called upon military leaders to show just those intangible warrior qualities that 
observers claimed were missing.  Facing the perceived threat of conventional war with 
the Soviets and the Warsaw Pact, AirLand Battle proposed to enable a numerically 
weaker American force to defeat a numerically superior foe using a genius for 
maneuver, advanced technology, cooperation between the various arms of the 
  They feared losing support while fighting 
one or more wars on foreign soil.  This emphasis on public support, coupled with the 
perception that such support inversely reflected a given operation’s casualty total, 
established a troubling precedent for American military policy in the years to come. 
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military, and allies.162
Given the nature of the All-Volunteer Army, the service had relatively few lives 
to offer - and the political and military leaders feared the consequences of sacrificing 
them.  Because of these two factors, these leaders believed that the U.S. public would 
not support a war spilling excessive American blood overseas, particularly a long-lasting 
war waged for ambiguous goals.  Peacekeeping, nation building, and counter-
insurgency operations placed lives on the line as surely as would a maneuver war with 
the Soviets; however, such conflict did not stir the national passions in the same 
manner as the potential clash of great powers.  The answer in the 1980s proved to be 
limited involvement.  Nations bound to the United States by treaty or other 
agreements received money while the number of Americans involved in their inner 
struggles remained low.  Limiting the body count limited the damage to the United 
States’ popular psyche.  It indicated a potential trend, however, in which officers 
anticipated the national leadership would exert itself for the prospect of conventional 
war and expend effort to garner popular support for such.  In other forms of conflict, 
however, officers perceived that the national leadership expected the casualty costs to 
remain low enough to warrant little or no public attention. 
  The doctrine proposed to gain victory in an overseas war at the 
lowest possible cost in lives – for two reasons.   
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CHAPTER IV 
THE ROLLER COASTER OF MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE 1990s 
 
In 1991, the United States led a military coalition that expelled an invading Iraqi 
force from Kuwait.  Some observers hailed the victory as a “revolution in military 
affairs” and enshrined characteristics of Operation Desert Storm as doctrinal 
touchstones for future success.163
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  Yet victory in the Gulf War also reinforced 
perceptions among officers about American casualty aversion that had been building 
for decades.  In order to understand the role that the Gulf War and the 1990s played, 
this chapter divides the discussion of U.S. military officers’ perceptions of casualty 
aversion in American society into three sections.  The first section addresses the debate 
among military officers over whether Desert Storm’s model of low-casualty fast 
operations preceded by lengthy planning and preparation should serve as the blueprint 
for future war.  The second section argues that the failure to revise Cold War doctrine 
after the Gulf War contributed to U.S. military officers seeking to protect their forces 
rather than prosecute operations to victory.  The final section examines the reaction of 
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military officers to the smaller-scale operations after Desert Storm, such as Somalia and 
Kosovo.  It contends that officers perceived senior military and political leaders 
expected American casualty aversion and reacted as if it had occurred.  These officers 
attributed operational and strategic decisions, such as the withdrawal from Somalia 
and the rules of engagement in Kosovo, to the reaction against casualties that their 
leaders anticipated from the American people. 
Iraq invaded Kuwait on 2 August 1990; six days later Saddam Hussein declared 
Kuwait the nineteenth province of Iraq.  The American response came swiftly; troops 
deployed to guard Saudi Arabia from a possible Iraqi incursion on 7 August.  In the eyes 
of the United States military, the war began on this date, and concluded 14 September 
1991.  The short ground war captured the imaginations of most Americans.  Ground 
forces in the U.S.-led coalition invaded Kuwait before dawn on 24 February 1991.  By 
the end of that month, ground warfare was over, and American soldiers began 
returning home in March.  Military officers, politicians and commentators agreed that 
the military action against the Iraqi forces resulted in a resounding victory that, in some 
measure, put to rest lingering doubts resulting from the failure in Vietnam.164
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Only 147 U.S. soldiers died in or because of combat in the Gulf War.165
Through changing the ways many Americans measured victory, the Gulf War 
also offered a new conceptual structure about which military leaders sought to 
construct future wars. Major Joseph J. Collins declared in 1992 “Desert Storm will, for 
  When 
4,000 to 5,000 casualties had been expected and as many as 30,000 predicted, the 
simple fact that so little American blood spilled onto Kuwaiti sand lent credence to the 
declaration of victory.  In part the contrast proved convincing because of the audience.  
Many of the senior American military officers who commanded in Desert Storm had 
served in Vietnam at the company or battalion level, and perhaps equated the high 
casualties suffered in Vietnam with defeat.  By placing the war in the Persian Gulf on 
the opposite end of a spectrum with the war in Vietnam, the American leadership – 
political and military – helped make casualty minimization a, if not the, standard 
against which to measure success. 
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better or for worse, be a benchmark for future U.S. defense policy and military art.”166
By this measure, the American military had experienced some success before 
the Persian Gulf.  With the new clarity afforded by the Gulf War victory, Colonel Karl W. 
Eikenberry asserted that assessing operations by the standard of the casualties suffered 
allowed military leaders and politicians to embrace past operations as victories, simply 
because few Americans lost their lives.
  
Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi military provided an obvious “evil” to counter the 
proclaimed “good” of the invasion force, and the achieved goal of Kuwait’s liberation, 
while only one of the coalition’s war aims, proved acceptable to many Americans.  The 
speedy return of troops, low casualties, and easily communicated achieved goals 
became the core of this new standard.  At a level understood by the American public, 
the Gulf War set a standard for success. 
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  The negligible loss of life in operations in 
Grenada and Panama overshadowed the valid criticisms of American military 
competence in these operations, as well as sweeping aside the disputable achievement 
of American aims.  Similarly, Professor Eliot Cohen contended that past American 
interventions, such as in Vietnam and Lebanon, resulted in failure and defeat not 
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because of military incompetence or an inability to achieve operational aims but 
because of American casualties.168
Reaching a conclusion similar to Cohen’s, Eikenberry claimed that the low 
casualties had a negative consequence.  The low casualty totals from Grenada, Panama 
and the Persian Gulf “may have created strong, and unrealistic, expectations among the 
general public and civilian leaders that armed conflict, properly managed, can usually 
be waged with little loss of life.”
   
169
Many declared that the technological advantages the United States enjoyed 
over its Iraqi enemy enabled that nearly bloodless victory.  American military leaders 
and politicians furthered that argument, often through the means of the media, 
claiming that technology – primarily precision guided munitions and techniques of 
information warfare – granted operational and tactical advantages to the U.S. forces.  
These elites claimed that they adhered to a Western and democratic regard for life that 
preferred to spend money before lives.
  He argued that the new standard for victory set the 
bar high; unreasonable measures of success often result in an internal conflict harmful 
to the organization.   
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technological advantage, some Americans expected in the future to wage war without 
suffering friendly casualties.  In 1995, a Time magazine article discussing information 
warfare quoted one Air Force officer who claimed that in the future an attack on an 
enemy’s information network would gain victory for the United States “without firing a 
shot.”171  Popular among many officers, this perspective on the future of warfare 
emphasized the employment of the Air Force through strategic bombing.  Such tactics 
lumped with others to compose what Dr. Michael J. Mazarr, a reserve intelligence 
officer and a member of the Strategic Studies Institute, termed “disengaged 
combat.”172
                                                                                                                                                
1997 student paper at the Naval War College; Dana Priest, “Fear of Casualties Drives Bosnia Debate; 
After Recent Troop Missions, Americans Expect Almost Bloodless Battles,” Washington Post, December 
2, 1995, A01. 
  Disengaged combat proposed that increasing the distance between 
Americans and their enemies enabled American troops to gain victory without the risk 
of casualties.  This trend became so pervasive that American officers defended before 
Congress weapons systems under development with the argument that cancelling 
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them “would put soldiers’ lives ‘at risk.’”173
During Desert Storm, American military officers recognized and discussed the 
influence of media coverage of casualties upon the popular support for military.  Media 
coverage featured on officers’ lists of “typical constraints on military intervention.” At 
the same time, news coverage of disasters, genocides, wars, and human rights abuses 
around the world could provide an incentive for American military intervention.
  Managing the perceptions of risk by either 
enhancing or minimizing them became part of making their case and involved 
interacting with the media. 
174  
Following Desert Storm military officers postulated “media spin” as a new principle of 
war.175  Media spin mandated avoiding “operations that will alienate public support, 
while ensuring maximum media coverage of success stories.”  In making this argument, 
Lieutenant Colonel Frank J. Stech contended that units either could choose missions 
because of their media relations value or could keep secret from the media missions 
that would harm the military’s public image.176
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gained coverage and so public interest, while “conflicts that fail to generate good video 
fail to be politically real,” United Nations Ambassador Madeleine Albright observed.177  
In the age of twenty-four hour cable news, a military deployment anywhere around the 
globe could attract attention.  That coverage, however, proved a two-edged sword; 
American military casualties received ready attention as well.178
The three traits that made the war in Kuwait the new American standard for 
future wars were the speedy return of troops, low casualties, and the communication 
to the American people of successfully achieved goals.  Of the three, critics could not 
dispute the low casualty toll.  Similarly, the troops did in fact begin to return only a 
month after the ground invasion.  Yet Professor Grant Hammond maintained that the 
American military never left Kuwait.  In fact, he questioned what he called a string of 
myths about the Gulf War, including: “It Was a War,” “It’s Over,” “We Won,” “We 
Accomplished Our Objectives,” “We Can Do It Again If Necessary,” “Gulf War 
Represents an Almost Unblemished Record of Success, Superior Military Performance, 
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and Accomplishment,” and “The Promise of Airpower Was Finally Fulfilled.”179  
Hammond concluded that America achieved few of its political and military objectives, 
yet declared victory because so few Americans died.  So few Americans died in combat 
with Iraqis, however, because the conflict never became a war; at the height of 
hostilities, Americans proved less likely to suffer violent death in the combat theater 
than at home in the United States.  How media portrayed the Gulf War elevated public 
confidence in the military to 85 percent, greater than any other institution in the 
country – but troops remained in the Gulf, Saddam Hussein remained in power and 
continued to pose a threat to Kuwait, and most of the Iraqi Republican Guard remained 
intact.  Each of these results represented objectives unachieved.180  Perhaps the most 
damning condemnation of Operation Desert Storm, however, came seven years later. 
In 1998, General Anthony C. Zinni hailed as a success another attack on Iraq, a bombing 
operation in support of ongoing U.N. sanctions.  The operation received such 
commendation because it suffered zero casualties.181
                                                 
179 Grant T. Hammond, “Myths of the Gulf War,” 7-15. 
  Such criticism cast doubt upon 
the validity of assertions that future wars could -- or should -- be fought on the Gulf 
War model. 
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With the end of the Cold War dawned what President George H. W. Bush 
believed to be a uni-polar “New World Order.”  The new cliché held that the fading 
Soviet Union had ceded its role in the bipolar geopolitical arena, leaving the United 
States as the sole superpower.  Many observers, military officers, analysts and 
commentators determined that America had the “worldwide interests, worldwide 
vulnerability, and worldwide strategic mobility” to require, desire, and maintain global 
stability.182  This worldwide paradigm complemented a media that provided the 
American people with remarkable access to situations and information around the 
globe.  Major General William A. Stofft argued that the ability, through the media, to 
view more of the world would increase domestic pressure on the U.S. government to 
intervene, in order to “alleviate the consequences of ethnic conflict.”183
Some American military officers contended that such a dramatic change should 
prompt a reexamination of military doctrine.  The dissipation of the Cold War left the 
United States military facing the 1990s with doctrine devised for the Soviet military 
  Some of these 
military operations would derive from political motivations; some would spring from a 
humanitarian desire to save lives.  The breadth and scope of conflict throughout the 
“Third World” suggested that the American military would have a great variety of 
similar operations and minimal time to prepare for them.   
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without any likelihood of facing a Soviet army in a conventional war.  Instead, the 
American military faced ongoing low-intensity operations and military operations other 
than war and expected more in the near future.  AirLand Battle doctrine emphasized 
the conventional clash while minimizing the unconventional and some officers 
expressed doubt it was suited for the future operations they expected.  They 
referenced Grenada, El Salvador and Lebanon as their benchmarks for future 
operations, as well as the Reagan administration’s war on drugs.184 Colonel Andrew J. 
Bacevich, for example, asserted in an article in 1990 that making such a change 
required a change in strategic perspective.  Rather than embrace such change he 
expected the military to cling to a nostalgic vision of traditional conventional 
warfare.185  In contrast, some officers cited Grenada and Panama to maintain that 
AirLand Battle was suited for post-Cold War contingencies.186
The Gulf War interrupted the discussion about doctrine and derailed any 
consideration for dramatic change.  Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 allowed the 
United States to postpone its doctrinal and strategic debates.  Here was a conventional 
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foe against which U.S. forces could wield AirLand Battle.  The nearly bloodless 
conclusion of Desert Storm seemed to reinforce the validity of conventional American 
doctrine.187
The reinforcement such a victory offered did not escape the authors of the 1993 
FM 100-5 (Operations).  This update to AirLand Battle explicitly urged commanders to 
minimize friendly casualties, in fact, declaring through its keystone document, “The 
American people expect decisive victory and abhor unnecessary casualties.”
   
188  The 
doctrine’s authors enshrined certain tenets -- speed, size, maneuver, decisive action, 
and overwhelming force -- all of which they described as minimizing casualties.189
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worth noting that the 1982 edition of FM 100-5 contains the same number of 
references to casualties as the 1993 version; but in 1982 two-thirds of these references 
note procedural reporting of casualties or tactics for reacting to nuclear, biological or 
chemical attack.  In 1993, the manual made two such references.  The other references 
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Desert Storm.  In the years following the Gulf War, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine 
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Command (TRADOC) established achieving “decisive victory with minimum casualties” 
as an essential task.190
Casualty minimization complicated the military understanding of risk and 
boldness in American army doctrine.  AirLand Battle urged commanders to take risks; it 
had in publications in the 1980s and it continued to do so in the 1990s, after the Gulf 
War.  AirLand Battle enshrined boldness as a key to victory.
 
191  Eikenberry, however, 
argued that training standards instilled in leaders acute sensitivity to casualties.  
Training to execute AirLand Battle, commanders tied performance standards for 
various tactical operations to “allowable friendly casualties;” training missions could be 
assessed as successful until they reached a pre-set number of casualties, at which point 
the exercise became a failure.192
During this post-Gulf War period, the idea of force protection gained increasing 
prominence.  The concept of “protection” had attained doctrinal status in FM 100-5 
  While the U.S. Army desired bold commanders, 
American military in practice demanded officers succeed in the risks taken.  The 
American military culture did not tolerate well those who risked and lost. 
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(1982) as part of a complex view of combat power.  It discussed protection in the 
context of utilizing terrain in maneuver to protect friendly forces from enemy fire in 
order to mass greater fire on the enemy, an idea reaffirmed in the 1986 edition.  In the 
1990s, after the Gulf War, this was transformed to a stand-alone mission touching 
elements throughout operations, termed “force protection.”193
To some officers, force protection was a manifestation of the priority which 
casualty minimization had achieved in American culture.  The military intervention in 
Somalia provided more material to fuel this view.  American forces entered Somalia in 
1992 as part of the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) with a humanitarian mission.  The 
Clinton administration did not expect conflict and anticipated costs commensurate with 
the gains in goodwill generated by aiding those starving and suffering in the African 
country.  Public support remained high until attacks on Pakistani peacekeepers in June 
1993 provoked a change in the mission.  Instead of humanitarian objectives, the goals 
became more military and punitive and Americans perceived that the “Somali’s seemed 
unappreciative of the humanitarian assistance received.”
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The risks to the American troops mounted until the 3 October battle between 
Task Force Ranger and the mob of gunmen in Mogadishu.  The United States quickly 
became aware of the eighteen dead servicemen resulting from that firefight.  
Politicians called for the withdrawal of American forces.  In their discussion of that 
reflexive action, officers argued that the American people had little more desire to 
withdraw than they had expressed before October.  They proposed instead that 
Americans, angered by the result of the clash, desired retribution.  Indeed, Major 
Timothy S. Mundy contended that the American people, averse to civilian collateral 
damage, “seemed to have no aversion to the (conservatively estimated) 1000-plus 
Somalis who had died when the Rangers were killed.”  Instead, Mundy concluded that 
most Americans polled favored escalation of the conflict.195
Withdrawing the American forces, officers maintained, had two significant 
effects.  It strengthened the significance of force protection in military doctrine and it 
reinforced the fallacious notion that “CNN contributed to U.S. intervention in Somalia 
and CNN gave cause for the U.S. to withdraw.”
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enhanced the perception officers developed in which force protection gained in 
prominence over mission accomplishment – particularly under media observation. 
Dead Rangers in Mogadishu formed a lasting image in American cultural 
memory.  The eighteen killed in action in Somalia did not constitute a significant 
operational factor, yet the images proved “politically overwhelming,” as witnessed by 
the subsequent withdrawal of American forces.197  Major Kevin S. Woods pointed out 
later “one need only to read through the U.S. military’s joint warfighting doctrine to 
find ready references to minimizing casualties.”198 Citing Joint Publication 3-0, 
Operations, and FM 100-7, Decisive Force: The Army in Theater Operations, Woods 
concluded that the American military had prioritized winning in as little time and while 
incurring as few casualties as possible, a perspective shared among the officer corps.  
These publications tried to balance the need to minimize casualties with the need to 
achieve the military objective, but officers worried that force protection would take 
priority over achieving the objective.199
Soon after the debacle in Mogadishu, officers began questioning the 1993 
publication of FM 100-5.  In a 1995 article, Lieutenant Colonel David A. Fastabend 
criticized the newest evolution of AirLand Battle for maintaining a mindset obsessed 
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with strategic concepts dating back to World War II.200  Much of the problem lay in the 
American decision to separate “war” from “conflict,” and Fastabend contended, 
“national confusion about conflict is at the heart of today’s discourse on the role of 
military force.”201  Fastabend, among others, argued that war was conflict, and any 
conflict the military involved itself in shared certain characteristics, including the risk of 
casualties.  Lieutenant Colonel Michael H. Hoffman pointed out in the same year that 
peace enforcement missions shared this risk of casualties, complicating attempts to 
gather public support.  Much of the support for such missions derived from 
humanitarian organizations whose perspectives proved irreconcilable with the 
inescapable deaths following military intervention in an armed conflict.202
After the American withdrawal from Somalia the counter-argument gained 
momentum; “Somalia showed that a low-tech enemy could exploit American weakness 
created by a sense of invincibility.”
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these officers proposed fostering a “warrior spirit.”  The vast multitude of the American 
military by the mid-90s had not experienced combat.  This phenomenon, coupled with 
the realization that in the contemporary environment the American rear lines were not 
safe from enemies urged on the development of both this warrior spirit and force 
protection.204
The struggle between a warrior spirit and force protection caused some turmoil 
amongst the officer corps.  One officer argued that, in Third World interventions, “We 
will fight men who do not look, think, or act like us . . . this brutal, casualty-prone, and 
dirty kind of combat will negate many of our technological advantages.”
  
205  Just as the 
United States embraced a supposed technological “revolution in military affairs,” 
officers observed war all around the world becoming more personal, less likely to 
achieve resolution through high-altitude precision bombing of politically acceptable 
targets.206
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terms, they doubted that Americans were able to “engage in and sustain” the level of 
violent commitment he perceived necessary to overcome the enemies of the future.207
The abortive intervention in Haiti following the American withdrawal from 
Somalia served to foster this perception.  Just a week after the firefight in Mogadishu, 
the USS Harlan County, tasked to offload members of the Joint Task Force Haiti 
Assistance Group, arrived at Port Au Prince.  Major Kevin S. Woods argued in a paper 
for the U.S. School of Advanced Military Studies in 1997 that, before authorizing the 
Haiti operation President Clinton had asked for the average of American casualties from 
Grenada, Panama, and the Persian Gulf.  Woods maintained that the President stated 
he “thought the public would tolerate the average.”
 
208  Perhaps influenced by the 
President’s deliberations, orders directed the commander of the Harlan County to 
offload the task force in a permissive environment.  On arriving at the port to intervene 
in an area of important national interest the U.S. Navy vessel discovered armed 
demonstrators on the docks and small, armed craft in the port and withdrew.209
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This initial intervention in Haiti did not result in any casualties.  Rather, 
influenced by the American political and military environment the commander on the 
scene chose not to risk suffering losses.  Marine Corps Major Robert F. Wendel argued 
that “passive or unprepared leadership” made the Harlan County unable to accomplish 
its mission, forcing the United States to change its Haiti policy.  Wendel contrasted that 
scenario with the successful intervention a year later in which “the determination to 
use force, created a situation where combat was unnecessary,” concluding that the 
willingness to use force and risk casualties could serve in its own way to minimize the 
likelihood that casualties would be inflicted.210
The American military began revising AirLand Battle, incorporating the lessons 
of Somalia and Haiti and publishing a coordinating draft of an updated FM 100-5 in 
1998.  The new doctrine included treatments on war, peace enforcement, and military 
operations other than war, among others, under the rubric of “conflict;” it addressed 
AirLand Battle’s short treatment of military operations other than war and removed the 
inherent contradiction Fastabend had identified. Every military operation short of 
general war fell into four categories of operations within this new model of conflict -- 
offensive, defensive, stability, and support operations.
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pointed out that the draft claimed, “The most violent form of conflict is war,” and he 
maintained that this continued emphasis on general war rather than on operations 
other than war represented a shortcoming.212  Flynn argued for reexamining the idea 
that general war was the most violent form of conflict.   He contended the history of 
American operations in the 1990s demonstrated that unconventional wars had an 
equal potential for violence, particularly as he believed that future interventions would 
be more similar to that in Somalia than in Kuwait.213  Despite provoking debate, the 
draft of FM 100-5 (1998) was never finalized.  It did introduce, however, the concept of 
network centric information dominance as a keystone principle in war.214
Network centric warfare (NCW) and information dominance proved to be 
guiding principles in the last years of the 1990s, and NCW superseded the never-
finalized 1998 draft of FM 100-5 and influenced the discussion of casualties and popular 
support.  Officers extracted from the doctrine of NCW that, with information 
dominance, the military could expect to win wars while spilling minimal American 
blood.  Gathering information on just what totaled the minimal amount posed a 
challenge, however.   
   
After the stunning apparent success of Desert Storm, officers struggled to 
predict how the low casualty totals of the recent past would affect American 
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involvement in future conflicts. Officers struggled to balance the requirements of 
casualty minimization, force protection, and mission accomplishment.  Of the 
operations in the years between 1991 and the turn of the century, the interventions in 
Somalia, Haiti, and the Balkans serve as the best examples of that struggle, in which 
two distinct and oppositional factions emerged.215  The first claimed that technological 
developments, including methods of achieving and maintaining information 
dominance, would further distance the American soldier from combat until waging war 
cost no American lives.  The second contested that view, asserting that victory in war 
would always risk lives and that future wars would play out on battlefields where 
American forces would be unable to wield their technological advantage.216
In planning for operations in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo politicians called 
upon officers to predict the casualty burden that an operation might force them to 
rationalize before the American people.  There existed no reliable way to predict the 
casualties America might suffer in applying AirLand Battle to low-intensity conflicts and 
other interventions.  In fact, forecasting casualties had been a notoriously tricky 
procedure since the 1940s. 
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Perhaps made watchful by these concerns, officers observed that, after Somalia, 
force protection became a mission of itself and military officers began making decisions 
based not on achieving the objective but on the casualties they might expect.  
Recognizing that most politicians, as well as many in the military, believed that 
Americans possessed a casualty threshold, officers could raise or lower their estimates 
less in accord with their “best guess” than in accord with their own desires.  Admiral 
Leighton W. Smith, Jr., provided an apt example.  As the former commander of the 
Implementation Force (IFOR) in Kosovo, Smith discussed his response to requests for 
action against individual war criminals in the Balkans: 
What’s it going to take and what’s it going to cost? Then I’ve got to feed that 
back to the politicians. . . . “All right, you want me to do this, this is the price.” 
Remember what I said about the war criminals?  “You want me to do that, it’s 
going to cost you lives. We’re going to get people killed doing this. I might have 
to go to Kansas and tell Johnny’s mama that he got his head blown off trying to 
arrest [Ratko] Mladic in a coffee shop somewhere.”217
Colonel Richard A. Lacquement, Jr., argued Admiral Smith demonstrated that, in 
certain cases, the officer’s opinion “that the public ought not to accept casualties for 
this mission” proved more important than the relevance of the mission.  It proved more 
important, as well, than the public’s actual willingness to accept casualties for a mission 
– which the officer had no means of predicting.  From Lacquement’s perspective, the 
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admiral had opted to invoke casualty concerns rather than voice his own objections to 
the mission of pursuing war criminals, and Lacquement described Smith’s behavior as 
“inappropriate . . . it represents a corruption of the professional military ethic.”218
In practice, force protection outstripped its doctrinal roots. Major Michael D. 
Stewart observed in a 1996 paper for the U.S. Army School of Advanced Military 
Studies that, given the doctrinal confusion over just what constituted force protection, 
coupled with the political emphasis on avoiding casualties, it seemed that force 
protection would continue to gain in importance, particularly in low intensity conflicts 
or operations other than war.
   
219  The precepts of network centric warfare 
acknowledged the viable threat posed by those conflicts previously understood to be 
“less than” or “other than” war.220
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the concern that excessive emphasis on force protection may impinge upon the 
mission.221
Within the larger claim asserting technology prevented American combat 
deaths many narrower arguments thrived.  The Air Force renewed its organizational 
campaign for the preeminence of air power and strategic bombing in warfare.  The 
term “disengaged combat” entered the military lexicon and the idea of increased 
distance between combatants gained traction with the American people.  Officers and 
politicians justified weapons programs by asserting that the systems saved the lives of 
American troops.  Many of these programs focused on robotics to remove Americans 
from the edge of combat. 
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Adherents to this viewpoint flourished even as the American emphasis upon 
technology continued.  Colonel Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., called a myth the “accepted truth 
  Leaders lauded technology as the means by which the 
United States would maintain its dominance. 
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in the United States and many Western nations that information technologies will allow 
wars to be waged virtually bloodlessly.”223  The position of these intellectual dissidents 
maintained that the technologically advanced U.S. military, with its professional 
soldiers and ritualized combat, would find itself facing well-armed warriors lacking a 
technological support structure to attack and refusing to follow the formalized laws of 
war.224
This argument gained increased support during the operations in the Balkans. 
During that operation, an officer could claim, “The American way of war, and the 
American way of preventing war, is increasingly characterized by a desire for its military 
to conduct casualty-free operations. This casualty-free inclination to warfare . . . has led 
many self-professed military theorists to suggest, through editorials, that the U.S. 
military has abandoned its warrior ethos.”
 In so doing the American forces would find themselves caught struggling to find 
the enemy’s non-existent center of gravity while striving to protect their members. 
225
                                                 
223 Dunlap, “21st-Century Land Warfare,” 32. 
  To many officers it seemed that the trend 
emphasizing victory through casualty minimization imparted to many Americans, 
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including those in the military, the notion that “the warrior leader’s goal is to be 
successful without unnecessarily risking soldiers’ lives.”226
Military planning for intervention followed that trend by emphasizing force 
protection and standoff distance rather than a bold willingness to use force.  Lieutenant 
Colonel Richard J. Matason asserted in a U.S. Army War College paper in 1993 that the 
Clinton administration’s Bosnian policy, announced 10 February of the same year, ruled 
out intervention.  Matason claimed the administration made clear it would not consider 
even intervening with “aircraft, cruise and tomahawk missiles, psychological operations 
and other measures short of ground troops” on the grounds that “it would endanger 
the lives of the U.N. soldiers currently in the former Yugoslavia.”
   
227  From this beginning 
momentum built until officers could exclaim at the unprecedented emphasis on force 
protection throughout the operation.228
Officers noted that the Balkans, like Haiti, fell under the category of important, 
rather than vital, national interests.  They also observed the connections drawn 
between American casualties and policy decisions by the media.  Given these 
considerations, and in the post-Mogadishu environment, these officers nonetheless 
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determined that leaders developing policy over-emphasized their concerns over 
casualties.229  The emphasis placed upon casualties from on high created an ethical 
space some officers exploited.  Officers could create an image for themselves by 
exaggerating the casualties they anticipated for any operation and then achieving their 
objective with less.  Along another intellectual track, they could avoid a mission when 
they feared the casualty total would be unpalatable, creating an environment one 
officer found to be hostile to the warrior spirit.230  Lieutenant General Charles A. Horner 
argued “that American support” for military “depended in large measure on the ability 
to operate ‘with less than anticipated’ losses of human lives.”231
The ethical space implied in the phrase “less than anticipated” contributed to 
the obstacles facing the American military culture.  Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
General John M. Shalikashvili addressed the same ethical issue in testimony before the 
Senate in 1995.  General Shalikashvili stated, “I am very concerned about it . . . not only 
are we setting a standard by which this country will judge us [the military], but . . . that 
might begin to have an impact on our young [commanders who] have to sense that if 
they go into an operation, and despite their best efforts, suffer casualties, that 
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someone’s going to be looking over their shoulders.  How tragic it would be if we did 
that, because we would grow a group of leaders who, through their hesitancy, would 
begin to endanger people.”232
The concerns General Shalikashvili raised about young officers resonated among 
the wider officer corps.  Major Perry D. Rearick interviewed commanders returned from 
rotations in the Balkans to assemble a convincing argument that, “avoiding casualties 
was the top-priority mission in the American sector in [Bosnia-Herzegovina].”  He 
asserted “the tremendous emphasis on protection was an unquestioned, routine part 
of the operations conducted . . .  force protection was a paramount issue for 1st 
[Armored Division] . . . and was emphasized during all phases of planning and 
execution.”
   
233
Casualty avoidance in the Balkans became the most critical factor for 
commanders on the scene.  The 1995 Dayton Accords failed to bring peace to the 
former Yugoslavia and the atrocities perpetrated by Serbian forces upon Kosovar 
Albanians stirred the United States and NATO to intervene in 1999.  Yet the resulting air 
campaign did not stifle the Serbian efforts.  American officers argued that the 
mandated altitude of 15,000 feet did more to accelerate the ethnic cleansing than it did 
to slow the atrocities, begging the question of just what had prompted intervention in 
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Kosovo in the first place.234  Ultimately, the Serbian government sought terms and the 
United States and NATO declared victory, despite the dislocation or death of 1.3 million 
Kosovars, whose safety was a prime objective of the NATO war plan.235
Contemporary officers, for the most part, could not accept the validity of 
gaining success in conflict by avoiding casualties, yet they struggled against doctrine, 
politicians, and conventional wisdom.  The situation resembled the oft-repeated idea 
that, in Vietnam, the failure of public support had countered tactical and operational 
success.  In the 1990s, the American military culture mirrored that by emphasizing the 
cultivation of public support over the tactical and operational success.  Officers 
throughout the military contended that American leadership, overly concerned with 
casualties, had adopted an emphasis on technology and precision guided munitions in 
an attempt to wage bloodless war – no matter how ineffective such measures proved 
  In that sense, if 
no other, leaders sacrificed the ostensible objective in order to achieve another 
objective, that of a war without American casualties. 
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to be when measured against actual military objectives.236 In fact, they maintained, 
casualties inevitably follow military action.  These leaders urged that, rather than step 
further from their role as warrior-leaders, American officers accept the knowledge that 
“risk, sacrifice, and possible death” are a simple piece of military life – and that an 
understanding of this inherent risk ought to be “inculcated throughout the military 
organization and sealed in its doctrine.”237
Throughout the decade, officers examined the idea of casualty aversion within 
the American populace.  Particularly, these officers analyzed casualty aversion with 
respect to military and political leadership and the creation of military policy.  Many 
officers borrowed the arguments of sociologists such as Erik Larson, Peter Feaver, and 
Christopher Gelpi to urge that American leaders discard their obsolete understanding 
of the relationship between the American people and casualties.  Colonel Lacquement 
stated in a 1997 Naval War College paper, “Squeamishness about even a few casualties 
for all but the most important national causes is a myth.”
  
238
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mission and retracted support from those missions not worth the lives spent.  The myth 
of an uncritical response to casualties concerned them more, implying as it did a future 
limit to boldness in military operations, and creating an environment that made success 
more difficult, increasing the likelihood of casualties.239  Major Kevin S. Woods argued 
further that most military and political leaders would not believe that Americans did 
not possess “a distracting sensitivity toward combat casualties.”  That belief, he 
contended, affected political and military decision-making about the application of 
military force.240
Casualty aversion, even if mythic, had such an impact because the great 
majority of military officers, in every grade, accepted it at its least complex level.  Public 
support for military operations was clearly necessary, yet the elements working upon 
popular opinion were largely qualitative – except for casualties.  While the amount of 
elite consensus behind an operation could not be tallied in the nightly news, the 
number of dead service members resulting from the operation could.  The quantitative 
nature of the casualty tally, combined with the popular conception of the United States 
as a nation that valued life, increased the intrinsic appeal of this simpler understanding.  
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Many American military officers revealed this understanding of casualty aversion in 
their writing and in their dealings with the press.  These sources show some officers 
attributed this simpler understanding of the effect of casualties upon popular opinion 
both to the public and to their own ranks.241
By the end of the decade officers worried that the military had bound the 
definition of victory to the traits emphasized in the Gulf War -- minimal casualties, 
speed, and clean, tangible and easily achieved objectives.  Victory in the Persian Gulf 
could create an environment in which the military strove for victory only along the path 
made familiar by recent history.  If an operation suffered casualties, or appeared to last 
over-long, or aspired to achieve murky objectives -- even if the seeming setback did not 
threaten the operation with failure -- these officers feared such an operation would be 
condemned by military leaders, politicians, and civilians.
  
242
At the simplest level, the American military leadership reacted to the public’s 
awareness of friendly casualties.  It is apparent that many officers perceived in 
American doctrine, policy, and operations a belief in casualty aversion, and that a vocal 
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minority railed against it.  Inherently top-down, however, casualty aversion and the 
emphasis on force protection it generated affected doctrine and imbued the newest 
cohorts of junior officers with a mindset counter to the very attitudes which doctrine, 
in AirLand Battle, relied upon.  High-level belief in casualty aversion created a military 
culture and a body of American officers dedicated to minimizing risk and protecting 
their force, even within a doctrine preaching bold maneuver for decisive victory. 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The shattered military that emerged from Vietnam carried with it organizational 
memories still potent thirty years later.  Vietnam’s lessons marked the officers who 
served there and influenced their careers – and through them touched others.  Despite 
the difference in scale, and with thanks to the advances enjoyed by the media, perhaps 
the lessons of Desert Storm and Somalia will enjoy similar durability.  This examination 
of American military officers’ perceptions has demonstrated that these military leaders 
drew from their experiences to inform their discussion of the relationship between 
casualties and public support.  In some instances, applying the fruits of their discussion 
to their profession, officers influenced policy, doctrine, and the military culture.  In 
others, officers perceived that the public’s negative relationship with American 
casualties wielded more influence than did they. 
Shaken by the experience of Vietnam, U.S. Army officers reassembled their 
service and attempted to revise doctrine in order to address the world around them.  
Their chief concern with the American people being maintaining public support for 
military efforts, officers focused on the negative aspects of Vietnam and sought to 
avoid repeating that phenomenon.  Observers in academia and in the media blamed 
the mounting casualty toll for the failure of public support for the Vietnam War, but in 
its aftermath, most officers focused on a more pragmatic discussion of casualties.  As 
 104 
the military transitioned to a volunteer system it simply could not afford to hemorrhage 
troops as it had; while officers discussed their concerns for the psychological effects 
casualties had upon the nation, their priority remained finding doctrine that enabled an 
outnumbered military to achieve victory in modern war. 
 This priority changed in the 1980s.  The Reagan administration quickly 
withdrew American forces from Lebanon after the bombing attack on the Marines in 
Beirut.  The official history of the U.S. Army attributed the withdrawal of public support 
in Vietnam to the mounting casualties, and key officers began citing the sociological 
works discussing casualty aversion in their professional publications.243
In the 1990s this trend continued.  The Gulf War presented all the opportunities 
of a conventional war without the casualties expected.  By doing so it increased the 
  At the same 
time, officers began to rebuild the spirit of the U.S. Army, changing its doctrine from 
Active Defense to AirLand Battle, perhaps in part as an attempt to regain the glory of 
World War II and the maneuver victories of General George S. Patton.  Even as doctrine 
enshrined the intangible values of boldness, courage and initiative as keys to victory, 
officers perceived that it, for the first time, discussed protection.  Presented with the 
Weinberger Doctrine, officers surveyed the military landscape of the decade.  Lacking a 
galvanizing World War II or conventional clash with the Soviets but instead conducting 
operations in Lebanon, Grenada, El Salvador and Panama many officers fastened upon 
casualties as the linchpin of public support. 
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sensitivity of American leaders to casualties while raising the standards required to 
declare victory; in some cases, officers argued, the American establishment declared 
victory solely because it suffered few, if any, casualties.  Other circumstances, notably 
Somalia, hastened the military momentum toward doctrinally codifying casualty 
minimization.  By the end of the decade the emphasis on force protection reached such 
a level that officers perceived it acting against the warrior spirit they hoped to see 
within the army, asserting that senior military leaders sought to limit casualties rather 
than achieve victory.  Such activity had a recognizable trickle-down effect and officers 
at all levels feared the influence it would have on the junior leaders. 
As the decade closed, commanders like General Wesley K. Clark could 
convincingly maintain, “It wasn’t just the politicians who were pushing the military to 
avoid casualties.  We were feeling the impact of deeply rooted organizational forces 
from within the military itself . . . ‘Voluntary’ operations that incurred casualties might 
not be sustainable.  Period.  All senior military leaders sensed it.”244
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  Officers perceived 
that the discussion of casualty aversion and casualty minimization had gathered such 
momentum that it affected both the guidance the civilian administration gave to the 
military at the highest level and the actions of commanders at the lowest level.  
Picturing politicians worried about the effect casualties might have on the public, and 
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senior officers sharing that anxiety, officers noted that these leaders’ collective concern 
over facing the public with symbolically bloody hands influenced their decisions.245
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